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I. OVERVIEW
Despite post-Second World War aspirations to the contrary, the
State-dominated Westphalian system remains the key ingredient of the
global institutional architecture. Nevertheless, non-State entities have
entered en masse the space accorded to them by the “gatekeepers” and
have been able to exert some impact on policy outcomes across and
within national borders. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the most
significant actors among the non-State players have been international
organizations. A proper grasp of their relationship with their State
“masters” is essential for students of international law and politics.
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488

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:3

Agency theory has been invoked for this purpose and has proved to be
a source of valuable conceptual and practical insights. The World
Health Organization’s (WHO’s) underwhelming performance when
confronted with an epidemic/pandemic of enormous magnitude and
severity, however, suggests that there is considerable scope for placing
the principal-agent model in a much broader context and examining it
from an unconventional angle.

II. INTRODUCTION
Classifying international organizations is a task that allows for a
considerable degree of latitude, with the pathway followed normally
hinging on the purpose of the undertaking.1 The criteria that are
commonly used for such classification include membership (open
versus restricted), geographic scope (global/universal vs regional),
function (general vs specific orientation; as well as economic, judicial,
political, social, or technical focus), nature of contracting parties
(inter-State vs intergovernmental origins), and structural configuration
(supranational vs intergovernmental/traditional-style).2 These criteria
* Adjunct Professor of International Economics and Finance, Graduate School,
Faculty of Social Science, Chinese University of Hong Kong and Visiting Professor
of Managerial Economics and Corporate Finance, MBA Program, College of
Business
Administration,
University
of
Northern
Iowa.
** Resident Professor of International Law, Hopkins-Nanjing Center (Nanjing,
China 210093), Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS),
Johns Hopkins University and Honorary Professor, Faculty of Law, University of
Hong Kong, (you may contact Dr. Roda Mushkat by email: rmushka1@jhu.edu).
1.See generally Pitman B. Potter, The Classification of International Organizations
I, 29 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 212, 212 –15 (1935) (introducing the importance of
classification to the study of international entities as a means to “bring order out of
the chaos”); Pitman B. Potter, The Classification of International Organizations II,
29 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 403, 403–04, 406, 411 (1935) (elaborating that the
distinguishing feature of international organizations is that they function as
institutions for international government) [hereinafter Potter II]; CLIVE ARCHER,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 30–34 (3rd ed. 2001) (examining different
working definitions and essential characteristics of international organizations).
2. See Mizanie Abate & Alemayehu Tilahun, Classification of International
Organizations,
ABYSSINIALAW
(Apr.
8,
2012),
https://www.abyssinialaw.com/component/k2/item/477-classification-ofinternational-organizations (introducing different criterion for classifying
international organizations); Walid Abdulrahim, Introductory Topics on
International Organizations, DR. WALID ABDULRAHIM PROFESSOR OF LAW,
https://sites.google.com/site/walidabdulrahim/home/my-studies-in-english/19-
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are not mutually exclusive, the corollary being that international
organizations may possess a number of salient characteristics that are
not necessarily equal in prominence.3
The distinction between supranational and intergovernmental
organizations is of interest to both black-letter-law jurists and positive
international legal theorists, particularly the latter because of their
concern with the origins, dynamics, stability, and performance of
international governance regimes.4 This is a broad category
encompassing international organizations which is generally and
inevitably somewhat loosely equated, at the elementary level, with “a
set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area
of international relations.”5
Supranational and intergovernmental organizations materially
differ in their level of integration, a structural issue with behavioral
implications looming large on the positivist agenda.6 Supranational
organizations have the power to bind member States by their
decisions, whereas their intergovernmental counterparts lack such
introductory-topics-on-international-organizations (last visited Sept. 30, 2020)
(providing examples of international organizations based on functional elements).
3. See, e.g., ARCHER, supra note 1, at 30–34 (comparing definitions of
international organization).
4. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2–3 (Stephen D.
Krasner, ed., 1983) (emphasizing the importance of understanding an international
regime’s effect on behavior).
5. Id. at 2.
6. See MILES KAHLER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTEGRATION 18 (1995) (observing that “integration produces stronger
institutions that are more centralized, rule based, and wider in scope”); ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 22–23 (2004) (noting that the majority of
international organizations are “convening structures for horizontal networks of
national officials” while a genuinely supranational organization constitutes “an
entity distinct from national governments that has a separate identity and loyalty and
which exercises some measure of genuine autonomous power.”); see also MATTHEW
SPARKE, INTRODUCING GLOBALIZATION: TIES, TENSIONS, AND UNEVEN
INTEGRATION 1, 12 (2013) (examining globalization as both a process of increasing
integration, and as a codeword in political speech, impacting policymaking); NEIL
WALKER, INTIMATIONS OF GLOBAL LAW 204–05 (2015) (calling for reconciliation
of the various strands of global law, “aided and abetted by the ‘constructivist’ turn
in transnational legal and political thought.”).
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capacity.7 Genuine supranational organizations are a rare species and
supranationality is often a feature of an institutional arm rather than
the organization as a whole.8 Consequently, the dichotomy has lost its
sharpness and has evolved into a spectrum, with “pure”
supranationality and a “pure” intergovernmental constellation at its
two ends.9 By extension, the real question confronting positivistically
inclined international legal researchers is the degree to which
members exert influence over institutional decision-making.10
The degree of a member’s influence in decision-making, in turn,
hinges on the interplay between factors that bolster or hamper
supranationality.11 On balance, the emphasis in the academic
literature—whether exhibiting cognitivist, liberal, or realist
leanings—has been on the “bright” side of the picture.12 Gradually,
7. See Abate & Tilahun, supra note 2 (noting that “supranational” is often the
characteristic of a particular organ within an organization rather than the
organization as a whole); Abdulrahim, supra note 2 (listing characteristics of
supranational organizations).
8. See Abate & Tilahun, supra note 2 (stating that currently only one
organization can be considered supranational); Abdulrahim, supra note 2.
9. See, e.g., Abate & Tilahun, supra note 2 (comparing characteristics of
intergovernmental organizations to supranational organizations); Abdulrahim, supra
note 2 (defining the two ends of the spectrum as traditional or supranational
organizations).
10. See Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International
Organization: The Operational Constitution and its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209,
217–18 (2009) (listing the necessary conditions for codifying a rule into a treaty-like
document).
11. See generally MICHAEL R. LUCAS, NATIONALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 7–25 (1999) (discussing the factors that affect
supranationality, such as, the relationship with Nation States, global problems,
increase in the number of Nation States since WWII, etc.).
12. See generally Fedor Meerts, Considering Cognitivism’s Contribution:
Possibilities for Constructive Cooperation Between Rationalist and Cognitivist
Theorists of International Regimes, E-INT’L REL. (Apr. 26, 2008), https://www.eir.info/2008/04/26/considering-cognitivism’s-contribution-possibilities-forconstructive-cooperation-between-rationalist-and-cognitivist-theorists-ofinternational-regimes (arguing that knowledge-based (cognitivist) theories can be
seen “as a necessary addendum to [interest and power based theories], but must also
be seen as a necessary alternative to them.”); Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes
and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 1, 4 (Stephen D. Krasner, ed., 1983) (comparing orthodox and embedded
liberalism); Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 488, 505–07
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however, the pendulum has shifted, even if not decisively, toward the
“dark” side.13 This shift has manifested itself in an acknowledgment
that some of the forces operating in the global arena may be both
conducive and detrimental to international regime formation and
development, and that the powerful forces hindering institutional
deepening and cohesion (as well as a possible transition from soft to
hard law in that context)14 are unlikely to recede into the background.15
Two “negative” influences, have been accorded significant weight
in the moving supranationality equation—transaction costs16 and
sovereignty costs.17 The former are a source of uncertainty because
(1988) (elaborating on the five propositions of realism: (1) States are the major
actors in international affairs, (2) States behave as unitary, rational agents, (3)
international anarchy shapes the motives and actions of States, (4) States in anarchy
are preoccupied with power and security, and (5) international institutions affect the
prospects of cooperation only marginally).
13. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422–23 (2000) (introducing
criticisms and justifications of soft law that implies that soft law—law that “falls
short” of legalization—is a failure).
14. See id. at 422.
15. See id. at 456 (noting that it is not clear whether international legalization
will continue at the same rate after its remarkable expansion following WWII, and
that States and non-State actors can still achieve many of their goals through soft
legalization because “soft law is valuable on its own, not just as a steppingstone to
hard law”).
16. See Krasner, supra note 4, at 12 (“Regimes can make agreement easier if
they . . . reduce other transaction costs, such as costs of organization or of making
side-payments.”) (citing Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International
Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141, 154 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)); see
also Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT’L ORG.
325, 339–41 (1982) (regimes develop when “the costs of making ad hoc agreements
on particular substantive matters are higher than the sum of the costs of making such
agreements within a regime framework and the costs of establishing that
framework.”); Michael J. Gilligan, The Transaction Costs Approach to International
Institutions, in POWER, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND NONSTATE ACTORS IN WORLD
POLITICS 50, 52–55 (Helen V. Milner & Andrew Moravcsik eds., 2009) (defining
transaction costs and conceptualizing transaction costs in the international political
context).
17. See Scott Cooper et al., Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions:
Bringing System Structure Back In, 10 INT’L STUD. REV. 501, 508, 511–12 (2008)
(laying the foundations of why States may concede sovereignty to an international
organization and what factors may increase their willingness to do so); see also
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Sovereignty and Delegation in International
Organizations, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 82 (2008) (defining sovereignty
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they may facilitate progress toward supranationality and retard it at the
same time.18 Prior to the incorporation of transaction costs into
international regime theory it was assumed and mathematically
demonstrated, by proponents of decentralized cooperation theory, that
collaboration among States could fruitfully take place in the absence
of international organizations.19
The archetypal international politico-legal transaction is an
agreement or a treaty (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol, North American Free
Trade Agreement, and the North Atlantic Treaty).20 To engage in such
activity may be a resource-intensive endeavor involving substantial
negotiation costs, contracting costs, monitoring costs, enforcement
costs, and so forth.21 When these costs are modest, international
cooperation may indeed be pursued in an institutional vacuum but,
when they are sizable, there may be a strong incentive to establish an
international organization for addressing issues of mutual interest on
an ongoing basis in order not to get caught in an endless cycle of
resource-consuming interactions.22
costs as the difference between the policy a country would independently enact as a
non-member and the same policy the country enacts once the it becomes a member
of an international organization); Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and
State Sovereignty, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 120 22 (2008) (setting out the
understanding of State sovereignty as a bundle of properties rather than a single
characteristic).
18. See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Many Faces of International Legalization, 92
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 57, 61 (1998) (analogizing transactions costs to problems in
contract negotiations that make softer arrangements or softer commitments more
desirable).
19. See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and International Institutions,
16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 121, 123 24 (1996) (recalling the Cooperation Under
Anarchy as being borderline anti-institutionalist and evolution toward institutional
development); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act
through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 6 7 (1998)
(juxtaposing decentralized cooperation theory with regime theory).
20. See Gilligan, supra note 16, at 54 (identifying the transaction in the
international political context as an agreement or treaty).
21. Accord id. at 52.
22. See also id. at 55, 62 (observing that States would forgo negotiating
altogether if the value of the transaction would not cover the transaction costs);
Krasner, supra note 4, at 12 (describing the various causal variables affecting the
development of regimes); Keohane, supra note 16, at 331 32 (analogizing
international regimes to an economic market, where States decide which regimes
buy based on the analysis of relative prices and cost-benefit calculations).
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As indicated, however, the relationship between transaction costs
and supranationality does not follow a linear pattern.23 The point is
that, beyond a certain threshold, institution-building that entails
increased organizational autonomy and a lesser dependency on
powerful external constituencies may inflate transaction costs,
particularly if it associated with a switch from soft to hard law.24 By
its very nature, the latter gives rise to perceived difficulties stemming
from the complexity of the (notably technical) issues commonly faced,
coordination problems, implementation challenges, loss of policy
flexibility, and the like.25 In such circumstances, States may balk at
paying the apparently hefty price potentially incurred and may refrain
from venturing far along the supranationality pathway.26
As noted, sovereignty costs have an even more pronounced
dampening effect, and less equivocally so, in this respect , if genuinely
embraced, supranationality ineluctably translates into an erosion of
State power, a prospect which countries and their leaders are reluctant
to contemplate.27 This does not mean that joining and participating in
international institutions is without benefits, but the considerable
ramifications for the exercise of sovereignty ought to be duly
recognized.28 Indeed, this is not merely a question of rationally
23. See, e.g., Todd Sandler & Jon Cauley, The Design of Supranational
Structures: An Economic Perspective, 21 INT’L STUD. Q. 251, 260 62 (1977)
(identifying three primary transaction costs that would impact the relationship
between transaction costs and supranationality).
24. Accord Abbott & Snidal, supra note 13, at 434 36 (discussing the benefits
and costs of hard and soft legalization).
25. See id. at 422, 434 37 (concluding that States face tradeoffs in choosing
levels of legalization).
26. See id. at 439 40, 444 (hypothesizing that a State may prefer different forms
of legalization in different issue-areas because constraints on national autonomy and
sovereignty vary across issues).
27. See Cooper et al., supra note 17, at 509 (noting that the anarchical nature of
the international system ingrained self-help views in States and made States reluctant
to part with their sovereignty); see also Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 17, at 90
91 (suggesting that the sovereignty costs a State pays and the benefits the
international organization receives from the cooperation with that State affect the
State’s power or leverage within that organization); Hathaway, supra note 17, at
115 16, 120 22 (contextualizing the development of international law within the
trend of globalization).
28. See Cooper et al., supra note 17, at 508 09 (stating the majority view that
States choose to delegate their authority to international organizations, either
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weighing the material gains and losses because, as evidenced by
intensifying strains within the European Union (EU),29 the
quintessential supranational organization, the costs may have a
cognitive/psychological dimension.30
Given the presence of significant enabling and restraining factors,
progress toward supranationality has unavoidably been moderate and
uneven, schematically akin to the cycles of globalization and deglobalization observed in the socio-economic domain.31 Consequently,
the relationship between States, led by Anglo-American democracies,
and the elaborate network of international institutions that they have
created in the post-Second World War era of embedded liberalism32
has been rather complicated.33 It may be argued that this dilemma
because of a State’s normative orientation and identity, or because delegation
provides a State with material benefits); Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 17, at 78,
84 (noting that countries can receive associational benefits and network externalities
by joining other countries in an international organization); see also Hathaway,
supra note 17, at 141 45, 148 (noting that delegation to international bodies can
allow States to achieve goals that otherwise would be impossible).
29. See, e.g., Martin Loughlin, The Erosion of Sovereignty, 45 NETH. J. LEGAL
PHIL. 57, 69 76 (2016) (examining the erosion of sovereignty in the European
Union); Martin Gurri, Brexit and the Fate of Sovereignty, DISCOURSE (Feb. 25,
2020),
https://www.discoursemagazine.com/politics/2020/02/25/brexit-and-thefate-of-sovereignty (describing Brexit as: a nearly perfect specimen of the antiestablishment revolts; and reporting how every populist issue points beyond itself
to the breakdown of sovereignty ).
30. See LUCAS, supra note 11, at 28, 30 (summarizing Louis Snyder’s view on
nationalism and the modern Nation State, Snyder’s approach stresses nationalism’s
psychological roots and nationalism’s complex combinations of political,
economic, social, and cultural roots); see also David A. Lake, The New Sovereignty
in International Relations, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 303, 319 20 (2003) (cautioning that
hierarchy should not be overlooked when studying international relations); Stephen
Tierney, Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary
Challenges to the Nation State, 54 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 161, 173, 181 (2005)
(noting that the nationhood can provide a form of psychological security and a sense
of historical continuity).
31. See PETER A.G. VAN BERGEIJK, DEGLOBALIZATION 2.0: TRADE AND
OPENNESS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE GREAT RECESSION 11 (2019)
(explaining deglobalization trends in international trade and finance sector).
32. See JUDE C. HAYS, GLOBALIZATION AND THE NEW POLITICS OF EMBEDDED
LIBERALISM 11 (2009) (defining embedded liberalism as the domestic social
compact on which the post-World War II international economy was built [upon]. ).
33. See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, International Organizations and the
Frankenstein Problem, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 999, 999 1000, 1009 25 (2013) (noting
the trade-off between the preservation of State control over the international system
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bears similarities to a situation where an actor driven by conflicting
forces gives with one hand and takes away with the other.34
A number of explanatory frameworks have been offered to account
for the underlying dynamics.35 The one most widely relied upon has
been the principal-agent model, which conceives of States as
principals and their representatives at international organizations and
even nationals employed at such institutions as their agents.36 The aim
of this article is to re-examine this model in light of the recent WHO
response to the emerging COVID-19 threat. The ensuing sections
outline the model’s application in legal analysis, its use in dissecting
the interplay between States and international organizations, the
WHO’s structural-functional underpinnings, outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic, WHO response thereto, and its implications for the
principal-agent model (which are also briefly addressed in the
conclusion).

III. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL AND THE
LAW: A GOOD FIT?
Delegation, which involves the assignment of authority by one party
to another, is a phenomenon frequently encountered in numerous
spheres of personal and professional activity.37 It features perhaps
and the creation of effective and productive international organizations).
34. Compare Rosemary Foot et al., Introduction, in US HEGEMONY AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE UNITED STATES AND MULTILATERAL
INSTITUTIONS 5, 8 (Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, & Michael Mastanduno
eds., 2003) (analyzing the apparently conflicting behavior of the United States in
multilateral institutions), with Simon Chesterman, Asia’s Ambivalence about
International Law and Institutions: Past, Present and Futures, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L.
945, 957–62 (2016) (examining Asia’s under-participation and under-representation
“despite the fact that Asian States have arguably benefited most from the security
and economic dividends provided by international law and institutions”).
35. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 19, at 6–8 (reviewing the different theories
offered to explain international organizations).
36. See Ronald Vaubel, Principal-Agent Problems in International
Organizations, 1 REV. INT’L ORG. 125, 126 (2006) (providing a visual representation
of the principal-agent problem of international organizations).
37. See generally ROBERT B. NELSON, EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES THROUGH
DELEGATION 2 (1994) (providing an example of delegation in a professional office
setting); John R. Graham et al., Capital Allocation and Delegation of DecisionMaking Authority within Firms, 115 J. FIN. ECON. 449, 449–50 (2015) (examining
delegation in a corporate setting); Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and
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most prominently in the institutional space, both the profit-oriented
and not-for-profit segments, where substantial resources are channeled
toward structuring superior-subordinate relationships in a manner
designed to enhance accountability, efficiency, employee/member
motivation, fairness, and transparency.38 In that context, properly
executed delegation is generally regarded favorably and contrasted
with more coercive supervisory styles involving a high degree of
micromanagement. 39
Delegation is also an integral component of democratic discourse. 40
Athenian-type forms of political organization, featuring direct
grassroots participation in communal decision- making, have largely
been consigned to history and have been supplanted by representative
Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions, 25 W. EUR. POL. 1, 1
(2002) (introducing the emerging practice of delegation by States and government
entities to non-majoritarian institutions); Sabrina Schneider & Michael Leyer, Me or
Information Technology? Adoption of Artificial Intelligence in the Delegation of
Personal Strategic Decisions, 40 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 223, 223 24
(2019) (studying the impact of choice complexity and cognitive perception on the
delegation of a strategic decision).
38. See Lukas Angst & Karol Jan Borowiecki, Delegation and Motivation, 76
THEORY & DECISION 363, 382 (2014) (concluding that the principal can change her
agent’s beliefs and perceptions about delegation by plausibly conveying her motives
to her agent); Patricia M. Sias & Frederic M. Jablin, Differential SuperiorSubordinate Relations, Perceptions of Fairness, and Coworker Communication, 22
HUM. COMMC’N RSCH. 5, 5 (1995) (examining the complex relationships between
differential superior-subordinate relations, fairness perceptions, and coworker
communication); see also J. Peter Venton, A General Theory of Delegation,
Accountability and Empowerment, 12 CAN. J. PROGRAM EVALUATION 163, 167, 183
(1997) (explaining how the delegation-accountability relationship can potentially
improve performance although it also presents the challenge of getting the agent’s
commitment to meet the principal’s expectations); see generally Benedict
Mathebula & Brian Barnard, The Factors of Delegation Success: Accountability,
Compliance and Work Quality, 8 EXPERT J. BUS. & MGMT. 76, 76, 86 (2020)
(discussing the importance of maintaining a strong bond between subordinates and
their managers); ROBERT NELSON, EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES THROUGH
DELEGATION 4, 5 (1994) (explaining the benefits of effective delegation).
39. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, RICHARD BOYATZIS & ANNIE MCKEE, PRIMAL
LEADERSHIP 4 5 (2002) (emphasizing the importance of a leader’s mood and tone
when delegating to subordinates).
40. See Dietmar Braun & Fabrizio Gilardi, Introduction, in DELEGATIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 1, 1 2 (Dietmar Braun & Fabrizio Gilardi eds.,
2006) (exemplifying how delegation is very commonly used in the political
phenomenon of democratic representation).
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variants.41 Swiss-like hybrids, combining direct and indirect (i.e. via
intermediaries) citizen engagement in policy formulation at the
national level42 do exist but are a scarce commodity.43 Instead, the
democratic territory is predominantly populated with representative
governance regimes of different shapes.44 In such institutional
environments, authority essentially grows from the grassroots through
a chain consisting of the legislature and multiple layers of the
executive branch.45
Despite the many advantages of delegation, it is not without its
problems.46 The principal-agent model purports to pinpoint and, where
feasible, provide remedies for the problems inherent in the concept of
delegation.47 This analytical vehicle centers on two actors, a principal
and an agent.48 In a relationship entailing the transfer of authority from
one party to another, the former is the delegator and the latter is the
delegatee.49 As outlined, such a transfer may prove rewarding for both
parties and generate positive externalities to boot.50 Yet, even if
41. See also NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND
GENEALOGY 2 3 (2006) (comparing genuine democracies to the modern
representative democracies).
42. See CLIVE H. CHURCH, THE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND
1 22 (2004) (examining Switzerland’s bottom-up approach to politics).
43. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 7 (2006) (examining the
diversity of democratic models).
44. See generally id. at 1 10.
45. See DELEGATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, supra note 40, at 1 2
(explaining the Burke method of governance where the citizen’s authority is
delegated through a deputy who works with other deputies to define the common
will ).
46. See Advantages and Disadvantages of Delegation: Effective Delegation
Skills?, STRENGTHSCAPE, https://strengthscape.com/advantages-and-disadvantagesof-delegation/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (highlighting some of the disadvantages
of delegation such as lack of knowledge of employees, lack of trust, lack of interest,
lack of credit, and lack of authority).
47. See Jean-Jacques Laffont, Introduction, in THE PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL:
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF INCENTIVES xi, xi (Jean-Jacques Laffont ed., 2003)
(exploring the question of what is the optimal structure of the contract that the
principal should offer to the agent).
48. See id.
49. Delegator, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Delegatee, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
50. See STRENGTHSCAPE, supra note 46 (highlighting the advantages of
delegation such as best use of human resources, extra time for managers to work on
more critical tasks, faster work process, stronger team spirit, improved interpersonal
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undertaken on an entirely voluntary basis, it may engender serious
conflict due to the fact that the interests of the principal and the agent
may not fully converge in practice, prompting the former to take steps
not wholly compatible with the objectives of the latter.51
The classic example of the inherent discord between principals and
their agents is found in in the realm of business administration, where
shareholders’/principals’ and managers’/ agents’ goals often merely
partially overlap. 52 The underlying friction is further compounded by
asymmetric information that allows the better-informed
party/manager/ agent to chart his or her own course without reference
to the less informed party, which is endowed with greater authority/
shareholder/ principal.53 In such circumstances, elaborate monitoring
devices and incentive-based mechanisms may have to be introduced
to bring about a closer alignment between the interests of principals
and their agents.54
Another commonly invoked example is that of elected
representatives/agents whose actions do not suitably reflect the wishes
of their constituencies/principals or government officials/agents who
pursue policies that deviate from legislators’/principals’ intent.55
and intrapersonal communication, inflow of new and innovative ideas, stronger
“bench strength” of the team).
51. See Christopher R. Yukins, A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law
through the Principal-Agent Model, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 63, 64 (2010) (cautioning
that the risk posed by this conflict of interest increases when an asymmetry of
information in the agent’s favor exists).
52. See Günter Bamberg & Klaus Spremann, Prologue, in AGENCY THEORY,
AGENCY, INFORMATION, AND INCENTIVES 1, 2 (Günter Bamberg & Klaus Spremann
eds., 1987) (explaining that the principal-agent relationship is often more complex
and has more than two actors).
53. See Matthias Kiefer, Edward Jones, & Andrew Adams, Shareholders and
Managers as Principal-Agent Hierarchies and Cooperative Teams, 9 QUALITATIVE
RSCH. FIN. MKTS. 48, 53 (2017) (discussing the negative effects of asymmetric
information).
54. See Laffont, supra note 47, at xvi–xvii (explaining the effect of principals
committing to revelation mechanisms); see also Ronald Strausz, Delegation of
Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 337, 337–39
(1997) (arguing that delegation of monitoring is possible and profitable).
55. See Dietmar Braun & Fabrizio Gilardi, Conclusion, in DELEGATIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 239, 239–40 (Dietmar Braun & Fabrizio Gilardi
eds., 2006) (noting that the relationship between principal and agent is “subject to
opportunistic behavior and therefore to suboptimal outcomes”); see also Sean
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Again, this is a “chain of command” fraught with difficulties
stemming from asymmetric information between principals and their
agents, placing the former in a position of relative disadvantage.56 Like
in business administration, the focus of remedial strategies in the
“political marketplace” is on monitoring and incentivizing agents, 57
coupled with accountability and transparency-enhancing initiatives58
(also favored by promoters of sound corporate governance).59
Gailmard, Accountability and Principal-Agent Theory, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 90, 93 (Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas
Schillemans eds., 2014) (criticizing the plenary power of the State and the protection
it provides for politicians even if they act in ways that are not compliant with their
principal’s goals).
56. See Jeffrey S. Banks & Barry R. Weingast, The Political Control of
Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 509, 509–10
(1992) (explaining the influence that interest groups have, based on their ability to
provide information to political actors); see also Patrick Balles, Ulrich Matter, &
Alois Stutzer, Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of
Attention, INST. LAB. ECON. 40 (Nov. 2018) http://ftp.iza.org/dp11945.pdf
(describing the balancing game that politicians must play in order to balance voters’
wishes and special interests demands).
57. See PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND
THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 3–4 (1993) (explaining some of the approach to
accountability in government, which include (1) the performance accountability
method that centers on the establishment of incentives and reward for desired
outcomes and (2) the compliance accountability method that rests on efforts to assure
conformity); Monitoring Government Activity, CITIZEN ADVOC. CTR.,
https://www.citizenadvocacycenter.org/monitoring-government-activity.html (last
visited Sept. 30, 2020) (providing multiple examples of the Citizen Advocacy
Center, a non-profit organization’s government monitoring activities); see also
Simon M. Burgess, Carol Propper, Marisa Ratto, & Emma Tominey, Incentives in
the Public Sector: Evidence From a Government Agency, INST. LAB. ECON. 2 (July
2012) https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/62541/1/720520940.pdf (analyzing
the effectiveness of the incentive scheme in the public sector).
58. See Evert A. Lindquist & Irene Huse, Accountability and Monitoring
Government in the Digital Era: Promise, Realism and Research for Digital-Era
Governance, 60 CAN. J. PUB. ADMIN. 627, 631–32 (2017) (explaining that, as a
result of calls for accountability, many governments are becoming more “open” by
sharing data and other transparency measures).
59. See Niamh M. Brennan & Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance,
Accountability and Mechanisms of Accountability: An Overview, 21 ACCT.
AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 885, 887 (2008) (highlighting the importance of
institutional investors in corporate governance accountability mechanisms); see also
Benjamin Fung, The Demand and Need for Transparency and Disclosure in
Corporate Governance, 2 UNIVERSAL J. MANAGEMENT 72, 79 (2014) (calling for an
increase in various corporate accountability measures to calm capital market
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The concept of delegated authority and, by extension, the principalagent model looms large in legal scholarship and practice. This is
particularly true for administrative law,60 constitutional law,61 and
contract law.62 As will be illustrated subsequently, however, the
interest in that structural-functional configuration is by no means
confined to these three branches of the discipline/profession.63 Indeed,
agency relationships, which are ubiquitous, almost invariably have a
legal dimension even where the agent exercises implied authority
which is not granted in express terms (e.g. is derived from conduct or
custom, rather than delineated in a written contract).64 The corollary is
that delegated authority and the principal-agent model are analytical
constructs whose relevance transcends established divisions within the
law and traditional boundaries within the socio-legal space.65
volatility).
60. See Chester F. Krizek, Administrative Law: Delegation of Powers;
Constitutional Law, 13 MARQ. L. REV. 56, 57 (1928) (explaining the wide-spread
concerns about the U.S. administrative law system and its natural danger of
delegating power to a few individuals ); see also Francisco Cardona, The Delegation
of Administrative Decision-Making Powers: A Toll for Better Public Performance,
OECD/SIGMA
6,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a77f/0f71b61afe9c8947f255206eb13b62f
ab572.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (explaining the notion of administrative
delegation).
61. See Whitney R. Harris, Comment, Constitutional Law: Delegation of
Legislative Power, 24 CAL. L. REV. 184, 184 92 (1936) (explaining how the
constitutional mandate for the three branches of government function as a delegation
system); see also Georg Haibach, Comitology After Amsterdam: A Comparative
Analysis of the Delegation of Legislative Powers, MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMPAR.
L. 1 3 (1997) http://aei.pitt.edu/825/1/scop97_3_1.pdf (explaining that the process
of a State signing on to an international treaty provides for States to also institute
multilateral delegation schemes with the other parties to the treaty).
62. See DON MAYER, DANIEL WARNER, GEORGE SIEDEL, & JETHRO K.
LIEBERMAN, BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: MASTER OF
ACCOUNTANCY EDITION (2012) https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_business-lawand-the-legal-environment-v1.0-a/s41-relationships-between-principa.html
(providing an introduction to agency law). See generally Muhammad Masum Billah,
Agency Contract Under Conventional La and Islamic Law as Manifested in the Civil
Code of Oman: A Comparative Analysis, 4 ELEC. J. ISLAM. & ME. L. 109, 109 26
(2016) (discussing the principal-agent theory under Islamic law jurisdictions).
63. See Principal-Agent Law, LEGALMATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/lawlibrary/article/principal-agent-laws.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (comparing a
principal-agent relationship to an employment relationship).
64. See id.
65. See generally Laffont, supra note 47, at xi (comparing multiple models of
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Nevertheless, given its strict assumptions about interpersonal
dynamics and its tight structure, the model’s explanatory power may
well vary according to circumstances. This tendency toward variation
becomes apparent when examining the model’s application in
different institutional milieus, with such an effort yielding results that
range from clear-cut to ambiguous. Two concrete examples may shed
light on this indeterminacy, or the principal-agent model’s seeming
contextual validity, and at the same time its possible contextual
limitations—the United States enormous federal procurement
system66 and the elaborate United States judicial hierarchy,67 subject
to the qualification that there is nothing uniquely American about both
cases.68
Within the principal-agent theoretical framework, it is posited that
a procurement officer acts as an agent for a principal (or principals).69
The identity of the principal depends on attributes of the political
regime and the policy issue at hand.70 In a democratic setting such as
in the United States, it could be citizens, taxpayers, Congress, or the
executive.71 In a non-democratic environment, and contrary to liberal
values, it might be the top layer of the political pyramid or a figure
presiding over it (e.g. the king in an absolute monarchy).72 If the logic
underlying the principal-agent model holds, the procurement
officer/agent is likely to have objectives that do not fully coincide with
those of the principal (however defined). 73
principal-agent theory and its applications in various social, economic, and political
spheres).
66. See Christopher R. Yukins, A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law
Through the Principal-Agent Model, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 63, 64, 66 (2010) (noting
that the U.S. federal procurement system has grown remarkably over the past several
decades, totaling over $500 billion annually according to the 2009 White House
memo; and utilizing agency theory as a model to assess he federal procurement
systems and its reform efforts).
67. See generally Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and
the Judicial Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535 (2011).
68. See Yukins, supra note 51, at 67 (“Under this model, the procuring official
may be said to act as an agent for a principal (or principals). That principal may shift
from one political culture to another.”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (cautioning that the agent in acting on behalf of the principal may have
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This incongruity is compounded by the asymmetry of information
that characterizes the relationship between the two and the advantages
that inevitably accrue to the procurement officer/agent as a result of
that crucial imbalance.74 The more adept and resourceful the
procurement officer/agent, the greater the potential impact of the
unequal distribution of information.75 Monitoring devices and
incentive-based instruments may mitigate agency conflict in such
circumstances, although they may not eliminate it altogether. 76 Of
course, the more severe the conflict between the principal and the
agent, the greater the need for robust compatibility-restoring
apparatuses.77
The situation is further complicated by the fact that, in reality, the
dyad turns into a triad.78 Specifically, due to the prevalence of
contracting in procurement, the principal-agent relationship is
extended to encompass a contractor retained by the agent, who is
designed as a “subagent.”79 Again, if the premise underlying the
principal-agent model pertains to this set of circumstances, the gap
between the goals of the principal and those executing agent-like
responsibilities may significantly widen because the subagent may be
inclined to pursue her own interests and capitalize on any information
asymmetries working in her favor in the process.80
A procurement system is assessed in terms of properties such as
competition promotion, customer satisfaction, efficiency, integrity,
risk avoidance, transparency, uniformity, and value enhancement.81
The principal-agent model offers noteworthy insights into each of
goals that diverge from those of the principal and that this conflict of interest must
be tempered by monitoring and bonding).
74. See Yukins, supra note 51, at 67 (observing that “the more sophisticated the
agent/official in relation to the principal (the king, the parliament, etc.), the more
likely there is an asymmetry of information, and therefore, the more acute the need
for principal-agent controls.”).
75. Id.
76. See id. (suggesting monitoring and bonding as measures to mitigate conflict
of interests).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 67–68 (“The principal-agent model can be extended to encompass
the contractor in procurement.”).
79. Id.
80. See Yukins, supra note 51, at 68.
81. Id. (citing Schooner, infra note 100, at 103.).

2021]

THE CHALLENGE OF COVID-19

503

these properties.82 Thus, while competitive procurement via an
intermediary (formally referred to as a “lead systems integrator”)
appears to be a sensible strategy from a conventional economic
perspective, agency theory suggests otherwise.83 The reason is that
marginal costs may outweigh the marginal benefits due to the
distortion of the principal’s interests and the resource-consuming
measures implemented to minimize it,.84
The principal-agent model may also indicate how to seek customer
satisfaction and value enhancement in that context.85 One idea is to
sidestep the procurement supply chain and to grant purchasing
authority to program officers/principals rather than their procurement
counterparts/agents.86 The former are more likely to focus
determinately on customer satisfaction and best value than the latter
but, on the negative side, may be preoccupied with program success
and overlook its costs.87 Another possibility is to give voice to the
ultimate program beneficiaries/principals (e.g. veterans receiving
medicines from a government contract) in deciding what should be
purchased on their behalf (an approach known as “end-user
empowerment”).88
The cost ingredient enters into considerations of efficiency as
well.89 In this regard, the principal-agent model shows how parties
along the procurement chain aim to reduce their transaction costs and
what are the ramifications, for better or for worse, of their

82. See generally id. at 68–76 (elaborating on each element of a successful
procurement system).
83. See id. at 68–69 (“Agency theory explains that because the intermediary
may, in fact, badly distort the principal’s ends because of differing interests[.]”).
84. Id. at 69.
85. See generally Yukins, supra note 51, at 73–76 (explaining the dueling
principal interests of customer satisfaction and best value).
86. Id. at 74.
87. See id. at 74–75 (explaining that by delegating the purchasing authority to
program officials, not procurement officials, there is a risk that they will be so
focused on the customer satisfaction and best value elements that low costs will be
a non-priority).
88. See id. at 75 (explaining that the ultimate goal of “end user empowerment”
is increasing transparency into the procurement system).
89. See id. at 71–72 (“[A procurement system] is efficient when it spends the
least amount of resources in the process of purchasing what is needed.”).
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maneuvers.90 The purchasing officer/agent is particularly motivated to
lower her transaction costs and consequently “underinvest in any
given transaction because the benefits of careful purchasing will likely
be shifted back to the principal (or, ultimately, the citizen/taxpayer
affected by the government action), while the costs of careful
purchasing will be borne by the agent/purchasing official or those to
whom she answers.”91 The corollary is that “by parsing the
procurement process and isolating the roles of the principal and the
agent, we can anticipate how a drive for efficiency (for lower
transaction costs) can, in practice, undermine the system overall.”92
The procurement machinery in the United States and elsewhere has
attracted substantial criticism due to its seemingly overly cumbersome
nature and its controllers have been urged to meaningfully streamline
the behemoth.93 Agency theory, however, lends support to the notion
that extensive oversight mechanisms are appropriate in such
multilevel institutional milieu because of concerns about integrity and
corruption.94 From this standpoint, the numerous and strict constraints
imposed by the U.S. procurement law, for instance, are seen as
warranted.95 On similar grounds, the theory emphasizes the merits of
bid protests, free and unencumbered press, and whistleblower
protection as inter alia low-cost monitoring vehicles.96
Forcing principals and agents into a bureaucratic straitjacket may
lead to excessive risk avoidance that may “suffocate creativity” 97 and
“stifle innovation.”98 By extension, this may “lead to less than optimal
outcomes, as there will be reduced willingness to seek out new
90. Id.
91. See Yukins, supra note 51, at 73.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 70 (arguing that the U.S. federal procurement system has overly
cumbersome anticorruption regimes).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 70 (“Agency theory suggest[s] that [the] additional [anticorruption]
constraints are necessary because as the chain of authority stretches from principal
to agent to subagent, the risk that the procurement actions will be diverted from the
principal’s goals rises dramatically, and so there must be special legal controls to
dampen the corrupt conflicts of interest that could otherwise arise.”).
96. Id. at 71.
97. Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government
Contract Law, 11 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 103, 109 (2002).
98. Id.
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vendors or innovative technologies, or to use novel procurement
techniques.”99 Indeed, such caution, when exercised by agents, may
arguably constitute “a conflict of interest because it means that the
procurement process will be diverted from its optimal outcomes.”100
The principal-agent model helps to pinpoint the opposing forces at
work and underscores the need for achieving the right balance.101
Transparency features prominently in procurement-related
discourse and policy.102 As such, the deliberations and initiatives
undertaken tend to revolve around the availability of information
relating to contract opportunities and awards, with different scenarios
assessed from the perspectives of pivotal stakeholders such as
competing contractors, the press, or the taxpayers.103 Empirically
underpinned agency theory may add further value in this respect by
addressing the issue from a new and unexplored angle such as, for
instance, in terms of whether “the principal can ensure better outcomes
from an agent if the agent is afforded more information on the agent’s
own performance.”104
In light of the above account, it is apparent that the principal-agent
model may serve as a highly effective analytical tool not for merely
diagnosing conflicts of interests in situations involving delegated
authority, but also for devising conflict-of-interest rules.105 In the
specific case of the public procurement system, but not exclusively so,
there has been a discernible tightening of such rules over time.106
Agency theory provides partial support for the policy path followed,
yet it suggests that an “overshooting” may have taken place and that
there is considerable scope for reliance on a mix of monitoring and
99. Yukins, supra note 51, at 77.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 69 (defining transparency in procurement as “primarily the
publicizing of information on contract opportunities and awards.”).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Yukins, supra note 51, at 79–82 (noting that the point of conflict-ofinterest sanctions is to guide agents’ conduct in line with that of the “governing
principal”).
106. See id. at 80–82 (explaining that agency theory helps to explain why conflictof-interest rules have been tightened precisely because conflicts inherent to a given
agent are “at the heart” of agency theory).

506

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:3

incentives for this purpose, striking a better balance between
compliance and enterprise as a result.107
On the face of it, the principal-agent model should be equally
effective in shedding light on the structural dynamics observed in the
judicial sphere.108 George Tracey and Albert Yoon make it abundantly
clear that drawing an analogy between these two institutional settings
is an analytically and practically viable undertaking.109 According to
them, in the United States, for instance, “[l]ike Congress, the Supreme
Court must delegate a great deal of its work, in this case to lower courts
rather than to agencies.”110 And, “[s]ince the Supreme Court is
formally at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court’s decisions can
be conceptualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its
agents, the lower courts.”111 Yet, “[t]he Supreme Court has limited
resources to monitor the actions of the lower federal courts and state
courts; therefore, the possibility arises that judges will not comply
with Supreme Court preferences.”112 Obviously, “[t]he Court . . .
wishes to check these inconsistent rulings, but monitoring and
enforcement is costly.”113
There are some empirically solid research findings broadly
consistent with this assessment. Notably, Donald Songer, Jeffrey
Segal, and Charles Cameron, employing a technique called “fact
107. See id. (discussing the more recent U.S. “shift in emphasis” away from heavy
sanctions and toward monitoring measures, such as “mandatory corporate selfdisclosure” and suggesting that this shift has been effective).
108. See Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a PrincipalAgent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673,
673 (1994) (suggesting that the interplay between appeals courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court is a microcosm of the principal-agent model; i.e., a study of the
degree to which appeals courts follow decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme
Court in comparison to appeals courts following their own decisions, as well as the
level of control the Supreme Court in enforcing its precedents at the lower levels).
109. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A
Principal-Agent Perspective, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 819 (2003) (“Since the
Supreme Court is formally at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court’s decisions
can be conceptualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its agents, the
lower courts . . . The Court obviously wishes to check these inconsistent rulings,
but monitoring and enforcement is costly.”).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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pattern analysis” to examine Supreme court-circuit court interactions,
have established114 that “courts of appeals are highly responsive to the
changing search and seizure policies of the Supreme Court”115 but that,
at the same time, “the strong independent effect of the ideologies of
the judges gives evidence that judges do find opportunities to ‘shirk’
to satisfy their own policy interests.”116 To complicate matters, they
have also produced “strong evidence [indicating] that litigants play an
active role in monitoring by the courts.”117 Similar findings have been
reported elsewhere. 118
Such behaviorally oriented studies place a heavy emphasis on the
ideological dimension of the decisional calculus relied upon within the
judicial hierarchy.119 Conservative judges are thus supposed to favor
outcomes sought by the government in criminal cases, while their
liberal counterparts are supposed to lean in the direction of outcomes
pursued by civil rights plaintiffs.120 To the extent that the law is a
relevant component of the behavioral equation, it is merely in the
114. See Songer et al., supra note 108, at 673 (applying fact pattern analysis of
actual case decisions and comparison between circuit court decisions versus
Supreme Court decisions to the overall framework of a principal-agent analysis).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 673, 675 (suggesting that the likelihood of an appeal increases the
more circuit judges “follow their own preferences” rather than Supreme Court
precedents, and that the likelihood of these appeals by litigants is itself a strong
“monitoring” factor taken into consideration by circuit court judges).
118. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political
Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions,
94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 101 (2000) (coming to a similar conclusion that likely
appeals can deter policy decisions by using a “game theoretic model” applied to
Burger Court decisions); Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate Court Supervision in the
Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 143, 144 (2003)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court needs to make decisions “strategically” in order
to “maximize its supervisory control” over policy-driven decisions at lower court
levels); Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., Supreme Court Auditing of the US Courts of
Appeal: An Organizational Perspective, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 607,
608, 614, n.6 (2007) (suggesting that the threat of a circuit court reversal is a
“compelling mechanism” keeping the majority of lower courts from deviating from
higher court precedents).
119. But see Kim, supra note 67, at 537–38 (noting that Judge Richard Posner
suggested that the identify of a federal appellate judge’s principal is “a matter of
some uncertainty” and further suggesting that there is not a “contract relationship”
between the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal court appointees).
120. Id. at 536.
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instrumental sense of the term—”as a means of mediating the
inevitable conflict between upper and lower courts over policy
outcomes.”121
The overall theoretical framework invoked and these particular
elements thereof, however, do not neatly correspond with judicial
realities.122 Importantly, the Supreme Court is materially constrained
in its capacity to fine-tune the incentives of district and circuit courts,
and lower courts in general.123 Nor is there a direct relationship
between the judicial organ at the apex of hierarchy and those
occupying levels below it, injecting a degree of uncertainty into the
proposition that the latter are duty-bound to scrupulously follow the
path charted by the former.124 Indeed, it might plausibly be claimed
that “federal judges could appropriately be viewed as agents of their
appointing President, Congress, or the public.”125
Perhaps most significantly, from a normative as well as a behavioral
standpoint, the preoccupation with conflicts of interest along the
judicial hierarchy obscures the substantial cooperative ingredient of
the relational dynamics.126 Without doubt, ideational divergences do
impinge to some extent on judges’ decisions at all levels, but instead
of being solely regarded as “a signal or command to lower courts, the
law should be understood as the joint product of the Supreme Court
and lower courts.”127 The corollary presumably is that that “the
interaction between the Supreme Court and lower federal courts might
be more productively modeled as a type of mixed-motive coordination
game rather than a traditional principal-agent relationship.”128
Due to its microeconomic origins, agency theory may underscore
121. Id.
122. But see id. at 535–38 (noting that the “lack of an exact fit alone does not
mean the model cannot be useful” because theoretical models can provide insights
if applied to “new contexts”).
123. Id. at 537.
124. Id.
125. See Kim, supra note 67, at 537.
126. See id. at 537–38 (noting in particular that the preoccupation with analysis
of conflict-of-interest and policy decisions in judicial decision making can
effectively ignore not only the cooperation between levels of legal body, but also the
role of the law itself).
127. See id. at 538.
128. Id.
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competition/conflict and marginalize collective endeavor/cooperation,
other than in a limited fashion.129 This “bias” has been partially
addressed in the business literature, where the concept of coopetition
(synchronized cooperation and competition)130 has gained currency
but, as illustrated above, it is not being widely stretched across issue
areas.131 Given this backdrop, there may also be a tendency to see
competition/conflict where none exists.132 While the idea is shrouded
in controversy,133 the non-delegation doctrine, a principle of
constitutional and administrative law which maintains that legislative
bodies cannot delegate their powers to executive agencies or private
entities,134 is a hypothetical example of the limits of the notion of
delegated authority/principal-agent model.
There may also be scope for applying agency theory less
mechanically and more creatively than is commonly the case. 135 Oren
Bar-Gill and Cass Sunstein, for instance, have shown that illuminating
insights may be generated by turning the principal-agent model
129. See Mehrdad Vahabi, Political Economy of Conflict, 122 L’ÉCONOMIE DES
CONFLICTS [THE ECONOMY OF CONFLICTS] 135, 135, 161, 163 (2012),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43859951 (noting that political and economic theories
have difficulty balancing the nuances of competition/conflict versus collective
endeavor/cooperation).
130. See Paavo Ritala, Coopetition Strategy—When Is It Successful? Empirical
Evidence on Innovation and Market Performance, 23 BRIT. J. MANAGEMENT 307,
307 (2012) (noting that the theory of coopetition, though dating back several
decades, has only recently gained more widespread acceptance).
131. See id. at 308–09 (discussing theories of competition, coopetition, and game
theory strategies in limited, “knowledge-intensive sectors”).
132. See id. at 312 (noting that firms often “perceive their rivals and competitive
dynamics differently” depending on whether they are looking inwards at their own
industry, or outward towards another).
133. See Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 380–81, 421 (2017) (noting that different schools of
legal scholarly thought disagree intensely “over what role the nondelegation doctrine
ought to play in today’s legal system”).
134. See id. at 423 (noting that federal constitutional cases involving the
nondelegation doctrine were all concerned with “the extent to which legislatures
could delegate power to other entities.”).
135. See Yf Reykers & Derek Beach, Process-Tracing as a Tool to Analyze
Discretion, in THE PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 255, 268
(Tom Delreux & Johan Adriaensen eds., 2017) (noting the importance in creatively
tackling the application problem by “gaming through a wide range of potential
empirical fingerprints” that might have been left behind at each step of a causal
mechanism’s process).
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upside-down, so to speak.136 Specifically, they have explored, where
appropriate, the regulator-regulatee relationship by looking at the
former as the principal and the latter (i.e. the public) as the agent,
rather than the other way around.137 This has allowed them to examine
the regulatory regime in an unconventional and fruitful manner and
offer some valuable analytical and practical observations.138
Without detracting from the considerable merits of agency theory
as a tool for dissecting legal phenomena, it is reasonable to highlight
the need for devoting additional thought to concept extension139 and
intension,140 greater flexibility, and multidimensional models that,
besides a cause and an effect, encompass inter alia context,141
feedback loops,142 and intervening/mediating (both mutually
reinforcing and mutually antagonistic) variables.143 Richard Waterman
and Kenneth Meier have provided a number of useful ideas in this
respect.144 Notably, they have suggested that the unitary actor and
dyadic relationship (one principal-one agent) assumption be relaxed145
136. See Oren Bar-Gill & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulation as Delegation, 7 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2015) (explaining that this so-called upside-down shift is done by
changing the focus from personal decisions and looking at them through the lens
of public goods problems ).
137. See id. at 3 (suggesting that this regulatory approach depends on the way
interest align between the individual-principal and agent).
138. See id. (suggesting that this model helps to identify features of the analysis
that might otherwise be ignored. ).
139. See GARY GOERTZ, SOCIAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS: A USER’S GUIDE 69 94
(2006) (defining concept extension as empirical coverage of a concept).
140. See id. (defining concept intension as the concept itself ).
141. See DAVID W. BRITT, A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION TO MODELING:
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVES 111 31 (1997) (noting that the
context within which action occurs is essential for understanding social life and
suggesting that context can be difficult to see, for example, water is difficult to see
and appreciate to a fish because the fish is thoroughly encompassed by the water).
142. See id. at 94 110 (defining feedback loops as a closed sequence of causes
and effects ).
143. See id. at 84 90 (noting that both intervening and mediating variables have
to be related to the two original concepts in the analysis and that their existence must
either be affected by or have an effect on those concepts).
144. See Richard W. Waterman & Kenneth J. Meier, Principal-Agent Models: An
Expansion?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 173, 175 (1998) (suggesting that
there will inevitably be costs involved in monitoring an agent[,] and therefore
public and private concerns effectively behave like intervening variables).
145. Id. at 181.
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and that both goal conflict and information asymmetry be treated as
variables rather than constants.146 This is by no means an exhaustive
list, but it effectively brings to the fore the proposition that, insofar as
the law is concerned, the principal-agent model is a key component of
the theoretical repertoire, and yet that it should be resorted to in a
discriminating and at the same time versatile fashion.147

IV. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION:
CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE?
The global arena is populated by an assortment of players with
different identities who are broadly classified into two categories—
”States” and “non-State actors.”148 While unalike in their basic
structural-functional attributes, both are generally expected to share
three essential features: (1) An “autonomous capacity to determine
their own purposes and interests;”149 (2) “the capability to mobilize
human and material resources to achieve these purposes and
interests;”150 and (3) “[t]heir actions should be significant enough to
influence the [S]tate-to-[S]tate or the behavior of other non-[S]tate
actors in the global system.”151
Relatively speaking, States constitute a homogeneous set in that, as
“persons of international law,” they possess common formal
characteristics such “a permanent population, a defined territory, a
146. See id. at 181–85 (noting that both goal conflict and information asymmetry
are “clearly continuous variables” and that they are dichotomized in order to “simply
the presentation.”).
147. See id. at 197–98 (suggesting, effectively, that the theory provides interesting
avenues for research, but it should not be taken as the be-all-end-all of analytical
approaches).
148. See Marianna Charountaki, State and Non-State Interactions in International
Relations: An Alternative Theoretical Outlook, 45 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 528
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2018.1430530 (explaining that States are
concerned with national interests whereas non-State actors interact in the State’s
field; but that this is not to say that non-State actors are the less important party in
the interaction, particularly post the Cold War).
149. Hideki Kan, Actors in World Politics, GOV’T & POL.,
http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c04/e6-32-05-03.pdf, (last visited Jan. 4,
2021).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other
States.”152 Non-State actors form a residual and thus more
heterogeneous category that consists of “all the entities different from
[S]tates.”153 It encompasses “individuals (individuals in international
law) as well as entities, the latter spanning a large range of
organizations and institutions on the global, regional, sub-regional as
well as local levels.”154 Due to their diversity, “these entities cannot be
identified by common sociological features.”155 This is the varied set
where international organizations belong.156
Sandesh Sivakumaran has introduced a third category—”Stateempowered entities,”157 which are “empowered by States to make and
shape international law.”158 They do not qualify as States but, by virtue
of their empowerment by the latter, they may not readily be classified
as non-State actors either (e.g. International Committee of the Red
Cross).159 This suggests that, for certain purposes, such entities should
be considered a distinct category and handled accordingly for
analytical purposes.160 This need not universally be the case, however,
152. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, adopted Dec. 26, 1933,
165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1934); see Derek Wong, Sovereignty
Sunk? The Position of ‘Sinking States’ in International Law, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L.
347 (2013) (discussing the centrality of States as actors in international law; and
discussing the possibly outdated theory that States will always either be created or
succeeded, rather than a possible capacity for extinction).
153. Nicolás C. Santarelli, Nonstate Actors, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (July 24,
2013)
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0085.xml.
154. Non-State Actors, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS INT’L L. (2009).
155. Id.
156. See id. (noting that international organizations and non-State actors have
legal capacities, but those capacities are varied and limited by the function of the
organization within the overall international legal order).
157. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, Beyond States and Non-State Actors: The Role of
State-Empowered Entities in the Making and Shaping of International Law, 55
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343, 346 (2017) (defining “State-empowered entities”
vaguely as a category “between States and non-State actors” within the overall
framework).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., id. (citing the International Law Commission and the U.N. Human
Rights Committee as other such examples).
160. See id. (suggesting that it is because State-empowered entities fall
somewhere in between States and non-State actors that they deserve their own
category).
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because the mere fact of being empowered by States may without
difficulty be treated as an intervening/mediating variable in many
wider institutional contexts.161
Students of international organizations, pivotal non-State actors,
had traditionally been skeptical of their capacity to meaningfully
engage in any strategic pursuits dismissing, whether explicitly or
implicitly, the notion that they “can act.”162 This is rather puzzling as,
after all, “IOs, like all organizations, act every day in a thousand
different ways.”163 For instance, “[t]he World Trade Organization
(WTO) rules on trade disagreements; the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) makes decisions about military policy; the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) decrees picturesque towns to be World Heritage Sites.”164
It is equally puzzling that this stance remains partially intact. 165
Indeed, two mainstream theories of international relations/branches of
positive international legal theory, the realist and liberal schools, do
not conceive of international organizations as actors at all.166 Rather,
these influential bodies of thought posit that it is States that initiate
action, solely employing international organizations as a platform for
implementing their agendas.167 This is clearly the approach embraced
by realists and, albeit less emphatically and uniformly so, by their
liberal counterparts, who portray international organizations as “loci
161. See Charountaki, supra note 148, at 532 (referencing footnote 17, the State’s
structure and various interest groups can be intervening variables when viewed from
the larger context).
162. See Joel E. Oestreich, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS
SELF-DIRECTED ACTORS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 1, 1 (Oestreich ed., 2012)
(discussing the history of glossing over the power of international organizations in
theories promulgated by traditional Realists and Liberal theorists who essentially
assume that international organizations are swept up in a tide of State actors).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 1, 3 (suggesting that the puzzling nature of the proposition comes
from the fact that international organizations “act every day in a thousand different
ways” and yet, because they do not exist “independently of States,” international
organizations are still seen as largely beholden).
166. See id. at 1 (explaining that Realism treats international organizations as
“meaningless bodies in a world of State actors” and Liberalism treats international
organizations as influential only as “loci of social norms and expectations” but not
as independent agents in their own right).
167. Id.
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of social norms and expectations, but not as agents with their own
wants and desires, and the ability to act on them.”168
Viewing international organizations merely as passive instruments
of States or alternatively as an embodiment of exogenously
determined normative and expectational anchors is analytically
problematic in two crucial respects.169 First, such reductionism
deprives these complex entities of any endogenous substance,
implying that what transpires within them is, for all intents and
purposes, of no material relevance.170 Second, adopting this
perspective has the ineluctable consequence of turning the Stateinternational organization relationship into a one-way street,
overlooking the possibility that international organizations may
conceivably act contrary to the manner prescribed or even envisioned
by the States that create them.171
The idea that international organizations are not solely a Statedriven transmission mechanism lacking endogenous dynamics and
autonomous impulses is acknowledged in two recent strands of the
international relations/positive international legal theory literature—
constructivism and the principal-agent model.172 The former paradigm
has its origins in educational psychology or more specifically Jean
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, which delves into how
human beings continuously ascribe meaning to phenomena that are the
product of the interplay between their beliefs and experiences.173
168. See Oestreich, supra note 162, at 1-3.
169. See id. at 2–4 (suggesting that if we want to truly understand the role of
international organizations in international relations, we must develop a more
nuanced analysis of their behavior and relationship to State and non-State actors).
170. See id. at 2–5 (suggesting instead that international organizations have
legitimate importance in the world order and that they individually can affect State
behaviors and identities beyond mere coordination of State-desired efforts).
171. See id. at 4–6 (noting that although some international organizations are
created by the States to serve their own interests, many are actively working contrary
to State interests).
172. See id. at 5, 8 (defining constructivism as a theory “focused on the
bureaucratization of world politics and the ways in which large international
organizations are able to use knowledge and expertise, as well as their capacity for
organized behavior, to influence State behavior”; and defining the principal-agent
model as focused “on contracting arrangements between States and [international
organizations].”).
173. See BARRY J. WADSWORTH, PIAGET’S THEORY OF COGNITIVE
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Constructivists extend this framework by contending that States too
are engaged in a ceaseless process of interaction and learning,
immersing themselves in intersubjective relationships where
perceptions of reality (including those pertaining to interests) are not
constant but acquired over time in varying circumstances through
encounters with other players in the global arena.174 This everlasting
process entails progressive knowledge accumulation and
institutionalization of behavior.175 In that context, States establish
international organizations for the same reason that bureaucratic
institutions are set up within the domestic space— “to rationalize the
management of a complex world through the creation of organizations
and the application of expertise.”176
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore are the most vigorous
proponents of the constructivist-like bureaucratization of world
politics vision.177 They contend that international organizations are
able to leverage the knowledge and expertise that they obtain, as well
as their institutional capabilities, to tangibly influence State
behavior.178 In their depiction of international realities, international
DEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTION FOR STUDENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND
EDUCATION 1 (1971) (Piaget was “primarily concerned with describing and
explaining in a very systematic way the growth and development of intellectual
structures and knowledge.”).
174. See Oestreich, supra note 162, at 8 (noting that these interests that are
acquired over time by international organizations are attained mostly through the
“bureaucratization of world politics”).
175. See id. (suggesting that interests “are not given” but rather “developed” over
time).
176. Id.
177. See Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and
Pathologies of International Organizations 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 699 (1999)
(developing “a constructivist approach rooted in sociological institutionalism to
explain both the power of [international organizations] and their propensity for
dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior”); MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA
FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL
POLITICS 2–3 (2012) (“[International organizations] are bureaucracies. Bureaucracy
is a distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic and behavioral
proclivities.”).
178. See Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 177, at 713; BARNETT & FINNEMORE,
supra note 177, at 33 (“[M]any [international organization] elites have as their stated
purpose a desire to shape State practices by establishing, articulating, and
transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate State
behavior.”).
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organizations are not robot-style agents, faithfully executing the
wishes of their creators, but instead exhibit the same dysfunctional
propensities as any other bureaucratic institutions.179 The fact of the
matter is that “[t]hey are given some power and authority which they
are expected to use responsibly, yet they often fail to do so, and the
resulting outcome might be quite different from what was
expected.”180
Organizational culture is a vital element of any institutional fabric
that is supposed to play a decisive role in disrupting the flow of power
and
authority
from
States/architects
to
international
organizations/engineers.181 The validity of this argument has been
illustrated in a number of different institutional environments, notably
in regard to the modus operandi and reform of the World Bank182 and
with respect to the implementation and enforcement of human rights
norms.183 The lesson apparently is that international organizations tend
to have their own bureaucratic (equivalent to corporate) culture that
functions as a semi-autonomous filtering and steering mechanism.184
179. See Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 177, at 699, 715, 717–18 (explaining
[international organization] dysfunction is rarely investigated because “the
theoretical apparatus” used by orthodox scholars “provides few grounds for
expecting undesirable [international organization] behavior”); BARNETT &
FINNEMORE, supra note 177, at 35, 37–38 (deriving two theories for [international
organization] dysfunction, where one focuses on external influence and the other
focuses on the internal cultural environment).
180. See Oestreich, supra note 162, at 1, 8.
181. Catherine Weaver & Ralf J. Leiteritz, “Our Poverty is a World Full of
Dreams:” Reforming the World Bank, 11 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 369, 369–70 (2005)
(defining organizational culture as “the ideologies, norms, and routines governing
the expectations and behavior of the bureaucratic staff”) (emphasis removed); JOEL
E. OESTREICH, POWER AND PRINCIPLE: HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAMMING IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 106–07 (2007) (describing organizational culture
one of many possible “constraint[s] on the implementation of social development
policies”).
182. See, e.g., Weaver & Leiteritz, supra note 181, at 369–70 (discussing how
institutional culture affects change within the World Bank).
183. See OESTREICH, supra note 181, at 106–07 (describing how “the difficulty
of changing [] organizational culture” made it harder to implement gender-focused
policies within the World Bank).
184. See id. at 186 (“[T]he problem is not actually formulating a policy, nor is it
commitment at the top.”); see also Weaver & Leiteritz, supra note 181, at 369–70
(noting the “tenacious survival capacity” of the World Bank’s “deeply rooted
organizational culture”).
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The central constructivist premise that States and non-State actors
process stimuli via cognitive apparatuses akin to those witnessed in
the course of human development is difficult to reconcile with harsh
international (as well as domestic) political realities.185 Rather, the
behavior of players in the global arena seems more consistent with the
pattern encapsulated in a “soft” (as distinct from “hard”/RMIU-type
which involves unbridled utility maximization) variant of
rationality.186 Its essence is captured by the REMM (Resourceful,
Evaluative, and Maximizing) and RREEMM (Resourceful, Restricted,
Expecting, Evaluating, and Maximizing) models of man.187 These two
closely related analytical schemes aver that strategic decision-making
entails a determined mobilization of resources, forward-looking
information gathering, evaluation of competing alternatives, and
constrained utility maximization.188
Its limitations notwithstanding, constructivism provides valuable
insights that may fruitfully be incorporated into a theoretical
framework that is predominantly, but not exclusively, rationalist in its
orientation (i.e. does not suggest that “[h]umans are not evaluators any
more than ants, bees, and termites are evaluators [and that they are]
conventional and conformist, and that their behavior is [exclusively]
determined by the taboos, customs, mores, and traditions of the society
in which they were born and raised”).189 Compared with its
constructivist counterpart, the promise of the principal-agent model as
a vehicle for dissecting the relationship between States and

185. Roda Mushkat, Conceptions of Sovereignty and Identity Economics: A
Chinese-Based Exploration, 4 INT’L J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 245, 263 (2014)
(“[C]onstructivism alone . . . cannot provide an adequate account of State behavior,
in the legal sphere and elsewhere.”).
186. Roda Mushkat, International Legal Compliance as a Rational Act:
Theoretical Extensions and Chinese Realities, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 633, 674 (2012) (explaining that international conduct rules are
“prominently” affected by factors like social rationality, but they “are increasingly
[oriented] toward the exercise of soft power, rather than its hard counterpart”).
187. See id. at 651–52.
188. See id. (“The postulates are that the decision-maker’s wants are unlimited,
the decision-maker is an evaluator, the decision-maker is a maximizer, and the
decision-maker is resourceful.”).
189. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Nature of Man, 7 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4, 15 (1994).
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international organizations partly stems from its rationalist roots.190
China’s interactions with other States and non-State entities offer
ample illustrations of the inherent ambiguities and narrow confines of
constructivism and the need to selectively couple it with a more
realistic and robust explanatory paradigm.191 Constructivists assert that
national identity—in the form of a profound sense of victimhood
fueled by the experiences of the “Century of Humiliation” that lasted
from the Opium Wars to the Communist Revolution—is the key driver
of Chinese foreign policy.192 Even if partially valid, this claim
overlooks several additional manifestation of China’s national
identity, with potentially different (indeed, opposing) impacts on
foreign policy.193 More importantly in this context, Chinese leaders
have proved adept at manipulating national identity/ perception of
victimhood in a utilitarian fashion in pursuit of strategic goals.194
China’s international behavior also evinces that, unless injected
with some rationalist substance, the amorphous concept of national
culture loses much of its effectiveness as a tool of policy analysis. 195
The point is that it has seldom expressed itself in this socio-political
milieu as an elusive, emotion-charged, messy, spontaneous, and
unruly force.196 Rather, it has mostly taken the shape of
heuristics/rules-of-thumb consciously developed over time by Chinese
190. See Mushkat, supra note 186, at 674 (describing social rationality as a
“prominen[t]” factor in the process of devising rules to govern [international
organization’s] conduct).
191. See id. at 664 (“The preoccupation with expressive rationality has been an
enduring feature of Chinese international legal behavior in virtually all policy
domains-impinging on its compliance with international law in diverse realms of
interstate relations.”).
192. See id. at 674 (arguing that “social rationality” is a corollary between the
victim mentality and subsequent great power mentality in the Chinese history).
193. See id. (arguing that “China has been a rule-taker, rule-shaker, and rulebreaker in the global arena”).
194. See id. at 673 (stating that scholars have “tentatively suggested that China
may derive satisfaction and utility from positive reinforcement received from
external sources following acts of compliance and cooperation.”).
195. See id. at 673–74 (framing China’s management of its international
reputation management as rationality-driven process).
196. See Mushkat, supra note 186, at 673 (suggesting China’s “international
adaptation, and the rules governing it, are partly driven by a desire to establish
relationships of trust”).
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leaders to deal with external opportunities and threats.197 This
attitudinal configuration shows closer similarity to rules formulated
for decision-making under uncertainty than anthropological or
sociological conceptions of culture and is consequently referred to as
“strategic culture.”198
Greater strategic clarity and focus, grounded in rationalist logic,
have made the principal-agent model the preferred analytical
instrument for exploring the seemingly unsmooth relationship
between States and international organizations.199 This theoretical
approach to issues arising from the latter’s putatively semiautonomous status rests on the notion of a delegating contract between
the two sides.200 States thus establish international organizations to
fulfill certain objectives (e.g. addressing collective action problems,
bestowing legitimacy, and generating information) and delegate to
them the requisite powers to meet these targets.201
The corollary is that international organizations are accorded a
servant-like role, being “employed” to perform functions that States
believe to be beyond their individual capabilities or that would be less
197. See id.
198. See Andrea Ghiselli, Revising China’s Strategic Culture: Contemporary
Cherry-Picking of Ancient Strategic Thought, 233 CHINA Q. 166, 166–67 (2018)
(defining strategic culture in terms of culture’s role in strategic thinking); Anthony
A. Loh, Deconstructing Cultural Realism, in CHINA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ORDER 281, 282 (Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian eds., 2008) (presenting
arguments “which are critical to understanding what . . . a Chinese tradition of
Realpolitik” might be) (emphasis in original); HUIYUN FENG, CHINESE STRATEGIC
CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING: CONFUCIANISM, LEADERSHIP,
AND WAR 1 (2007) (examining the Chinese foreign policy from a historical lens
“unlike many realist descriptions . . . which focus on material power”); Colin S.
Gray, Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back, 25
REV. INT’L STUD. 49, 49 (1999) (critiquing Johnston’s realist construction of
strategic culture); ALASTAIR I. JOHNSTON, CULTURAL REALISM: STRATEGIC
CULTURE AND GRAND STRATEGY IN CHINESE HISTORY 1–2 (1995) (describing
strategic culture as “consistent and persistent historical patterns in the way particular
States . . . think about the use of force for political ends”).
199. See Oestreich, supra note 162, at 5–7 (analyzing [international
organizations] as actors in a principal-agent context).
200. See id. at 5 (“The principal-agent approach to [international organization’s)
independence begins with the notion of a delegating contract between States and
[international organizations].”).
201. Id. at 6.
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effective and more costly to undertake without properly
institutionalized coordinating machinery.202 Such delegation of
authority proceeds along contractual lines, with States designated as
principals and international organizations as their agents.203 The
latter’s task is to pursue the interests of the former in a way indicated
in the initial contract, and subject to revision in succeeding versions of
that contract.204
In practice, the interests of States/principals and international
organizations/agents often diverge.205 The latter are “engaged” to
satisfy the goals articulated by the former but end up endeavoring to
realize their own agenda or that of their members.206 A crucial
ingredient of the structural blueprint for an international organization
is thus an array of monitoring devices and incentives designed to
closely align the interests of the agent/institution with those of its
principals/States.207 If this is achievable and adequately attained, the
contractual relationship might be managed in a mutually beneficial
manner.208 On the other hand, where that is not the case, agents could
possibly take advantage of any “slack” in the system to tilt the scales
in their favor.209
Agents/international organizations and their members are
202. See id. (noting that States delegate [international organizations] “certain
powers necessary for them to perform their function effectively”).
203. See Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation under Anarchy: States,
International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 6–9, 12, 25, 31 (Darren G. Hawkins
et al., eds., 2006) (discussing the balance of power between power-granting
principals and power-receiving agents, which exists in terms of conditions set
between the two parties).
204. See id. at 9, 12 (discussing the role of contractual obligations both initially
and as revised by the principal).
205. See id. at 8 (“Agents receive conditional grants of authority from a principal,
but this defining characteristic does not imply that agents always do what principals
want.”).
206. See Oestreich, supra note 162, at 6 (“[I]t is assumed that [agents] will
actually act in their own self-interest, or . . . the self-interest of the individuals” in
their organization.).
207. See id. (“Principals should build into the relationship adequate means for
overseeing the actions of the agent.”).
208. See id. (“If the interests of the agents and principals are aligned, then
presumably the relationship can be carried out to mutual satisfaction.”).
209. See id. (discussing oversight slack and its effect on self-interested agents).
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particularly adept at exploiting asymmetric information to their
advantage in pursuing concrete objectives such budgetary expansion,
career advancement, organizational autonomy and growth, and
unencumbered agenda setting.210 Principals/States are not entirely
oblivious to the underlying tension between the centripetal and
centrifugal forces at work and try to introduce control mechanisms to
ensure compliance with institutional mission.211 A degree of slack,
however, is unavoidable because organizational monitoring and
incentive vehicles consume significant resources and a balance needs
to be struck between bureaucratic conformity and initiative.212
Moreover, the presence of slack does not negate the primary
benefits of delegation that, on the whole, produces superior outcomes
to unilateralism and, frequently, international cooperation that does
not involve delegation (i.e. non-delegation).213 Above all, delegation
in general, including by States to international organizations, is
believed to yield substantial gains stemming from division of labor
and specialization.214 Both are a ubiquitous feature of delegation.215
Division of labor constitutes its essence and specialization underlies
its raison d’etre—”[r]ather than performing an act itself, the principal
delegates authority to a specialized agent with the expertise, time,
political ability, or resources to perform a task.”216
Additionally, delegation by principals/States to agents/international
organizations produces a range of positive spillover effects. 217 Three
were briefly identified previously (addressing collective action
problems, bestowing legitimacy, and generating information).218 Their
210. See id. at 6–7.
211. See id. at 7 (“Smart principals make decisions to delegate even when they
know that delegation is not perfect, although they will do so carefully and after
designing the delegation contract as best they can.”).
212. See Oestreich, supra note 162, at 7 (stating that principals are incentivized
to delegate even knowing “some agency slack is inevitable”).
213. See Hawkins et al., supra note 203, at 10–20 (discussing the purposes and
benefits of delegation in the principal-agent context).
214. See id. at 13–15 (analyzing potential benefits of delegation).
215. See id. (focusing on specialization regarding labor as a key benefit of
delegation).
216. See id. at 13.
217. See id. at 32 (discussing “functional spillover [and] political spillover” as
contributors to an agent’s ability to influence a principal).
218. See Oestreich, supra note 162, at 6 (“States create [international
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favorable impact is reinforced by the role that delegation plays in
helping to handle policy externalities,219 ironing out disputes,220 and
occasioning a stability-enhancing (whether or not equitable) policy
bias/lock-in (whereby the policy winners who wish to sustain their
position of strength well into the future proceed to solidify it via a
policy bias/lock-in; e.g. permanent membership of the United Nations
Security Council being exclusively granted to the major victors of the
Second World War).221
As indicated, to realize these benefits on a meaningful scale, States
need to devise strategies for minimizing (as distinct from eliminating)
agency conflict or slack, which is not a straightforward proposition.222
Success in institutionalizing international cooperation through
workable delegation hinges on the heterogeneity of States’
preferences.223 The greater the heterogeneity, the less likely are States
to delegate authority to an international organization and, if they do,
the less likely is the delegation to progress smoothly.224 The outcome
of delegation in such circumstances also depends on rules formulated
to aggregate national preferences into coherent policies and to
maintain control over potentially non-compliant agents.225 Obviously,
the greater the number of States required to endorse a course of action,
the greater the resistance to delegation and the greater the agent
autonomy.226 Given the high heterogeneity of States’ preferences and
organizations] to serve certain purposes- providing information, solving collective
action problems, conferring legitimacy, etc.”).
219. See Hawkins et al., supra note 203, at 15–16 (discussing policy externalities
as a factor motivating delegation).
220. See id. at 17–18 (discussing dispute resolution as a factor motivating
delegation).
221. See id. at 19–20 (discussing policy bias as a factor motivating delegation)
(emphasis removed).
222. See id. at 20–21 (outlining strategies to minimize slack and conflict in
principal-agent contexts).
223. See id. at 21 (“[T]he greater the preference heterogeneity of States the more
likely [its] members will prefer the status quo to the proposed outcome.”).
224. See id. (explaining that preference heterogeneity decreases the likelihood
that States “will be able to delegate to an [international organization]”).
225. See Hawkins et al., supra note 203, at 21–23 (outlining the importance of
institutional rule-setting, power, and delegation in regard to principals maintaining
control over agents).
226. See id. at 21 (“Generally, the greater the number of States required to approve
an action, the greater the autonomy of an agent.”).
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the ever-expanding membership of international organizations in
today’s “global society,” the implication is that there is considerable
scope for agency conflict or slack, whatever constraints principals/
States impose on their agents/international organizations.227
Considerable number of studies, both qualitative and quantitative in
their orientation, lend empirical support to these analytical claims. 228
Three are noteworthy because they attest to the breadth and versatility
of the principal-agent model, focusing on diverse institutions such the
International Monetary Fund (IMF),229 NATO,230 and the EU.231 Ayse
Kaya and Mike Reay have employed quantitative techniques such as
content analysis and vector autoregression to trace the evolution of
IMF operational philosophy known as the “Washington Consensus,”
an approach also embraced by the World Bank, with a heavy emphasis
on policy prescriptions revolving around economic liberalization,
deregulation, and privatization.232
They have identified a pattern akin to “fragmented change,”
whereby certain facets of an overarching policy paradigm shift at
different points in time and via different organizational (mostly

227. See id. at 22 (discussing how power balance in multi-State coalitions affects
individual State behavior).
228. Tom Delreux & Johan Adriaensen, Introduction: Use and Limitations of the
Principal-Agent Model in Studying the European Union, in THE PRINCIPAL AGENT
MODEL AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 2 (Tom Delreux & Johan Adriaensen eds.,
2017) (“[D]elegation and control are highly political [and] their study touches upon
the essence of European politics.”); see Ayse Kaya & Mike Reay, How did the
Washington Consensus Move Within the IMF? Fragmented Change from the 1980s
to the Aftermath of the 2008 Crisis, 26 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 384, 384 (2019)
(analyzing the Washington Consensus to better understand “how ideas and
institutions change”); Robert W. Ruachhaus, Principal-Agent Problems in
Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazards, Adverse Selection, and the
Commitment Dilemma, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 871 (2009) (examining how
consequences of humanitarian intervention can reduce or undermine conflict
management efforts).
229. See Kaya & Reay, supra note 228, at 384 (examining how the Washington
Consensus evolved in relation to the IMF).
230. See Ruachhaus, supra note 228, at 871 (discussing the effect of prospective
NATO intervention in Kosovo).
231. See Delreux & Adriaensen, supra note 228, at 1–3 (discussing the
importance of delegation in the EU member-State context).
232. Kaya & Reay, supra note 228, at 384.
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internal) channels.233 Thus, some market-driven ideas (notably trade
liberalization, deregulation, and foreign investment) came to the fore
in the early 1980s, others (particularly structural reform and fiscal
discipline) gained currency later in the decade, and still more
(specifically privatization and central bank independence) rose to
prominence in the 1990s.234 These market-driven policies were
gradually over-layered with socially oriented programs.235 It is
significant that virtually the entire process was propelled by internal
agents and their “outside partners,” with hardly any contribution by
the Board of Governors representing all member States.236 The lack of
accountability in such institutional settings is deemed partly
responsible for the backlash against globalization that has ensued.237
Robert Ruachhaus has fruitfully applied the principal-agent model
to NATO humanitarian intervention (in fact, to such action by any
party).238 Agency theory pertains to this type of situations, in which “a
third party (principal) provides a security guarantee (contract) to a
domestic minority (agent) who wants protection from genocide, civil
war, or other bad outcomes.”239 The initiative is inspired by noble
intentions and may bring relief to the party-at-risk, even if belatedly
and incompletely.240 At the same time, however, it often has
unintended consequences which are inconsistent with the high-minded
mission and which perversely consist of harm inflicted on other
vulnerable parties.241
233. See id. at 386 (advancing the notion of “fragmented change – in which
selective attributes of an overarching policy paradigm shift, slowly or quickly, at
different [times], and via different internal institutional routes.”) (emphasis in
original).
234. See id.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 389–90 (discussing the effect of external influence on IMF policy
in the context of internal IMF Board conflicts).
237. See IAN BREMMER, US VS. THEM: THE FAILURE OF GLOBALISM 8–11 (2018)
(discussing the relationship between institutional growth and accountability, and
global instances of populist nationalism).
238. See Ruachhaus, supra note 228, at 871 (evaluating “the utility of moral
hazard theory and a second type of principal-agent problem known as adverse
selection.”).
239. See id. at 872.
240. See id. at 882 (“One cannot conclude from either case studies or principalagent theory that intervention is generally harmful.”).
241. See id. at 871 (presenting evidence that humanitarian intervention can
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Asymmetric information between the principal and agent is thought
to be the root cause of this distortion.242 The reason is that it is the
source of moral hazard and adverse selection (in microeconomics,
scholars distinguish between two kinds of principal-agent problems,
“those resulting from hidden actions, and those resulting from hidden
information [ . . . ] [h]idden action is what generates moral hazard;
hidden information, in contrast, is associated with adverse
selection”).243 Inadequately informed principals such as NATO,
handicapped when choosing and overseeing a not fully familiar and
readily controllable party in need of protection, may lack the ability
and/or the will to restrain an agent (normally an ethnic minority that is
behaving poorly), but agency theory suggests that better monitoring
and incentive system may mitigate the difficulties posed by
asymmetric information and reduce the social costs of humanitarian
intervention.244
Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen have productively used the
principal-agent model to shed light on the interplay between
centripetal and centrifugal forces within the EU.245 This supranational
entity is an ideal choice for such analytical examination because
delegation is “at the very heart of the European integration process.”246
For seven decades now, national governments in Europe have
delegated increasingly more rule-making powers to a succession of
progressively more tightly integrated supranational entities in order to
constructively address collective action problems and enjoy the
advantages brought by delegation.247 Yet simultaneously, they have
also opted to maintain meaningful control over European policies and
politics.248
Given this duality, “it does not come as a surprise that scholars are

produce unintended consequences in the context of potential explanatory theories).
242. See id. at 873 (distinguishing information asymmetry and preference
difference as key difficulties that produce issues in principal-agent relationships).
243. Id. at 827.
244. See Ruachhaus, supra note 228, at 880 (stating that for moral hazard, the
most direct way to avoid the principal-agent problem is with improved monitoring).
245. See generally Delreux & Adriaensen, supra note 228, at 3–4.
246. Id. at 1.
247. See id. (stating that the EU expected delegation to be beneficial).
248. See id. (citing control over the EU budget as an example).
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interested in questions on the design of delegation and control.” 249
Ergo, agency theory “has become a popular analytical framework to
study such political processes.”250 It is evident that this conceptual tool
furnishes valuable insights into “the reasons, modalities, and
consequences of ‘principals’ (e.g. member [S]tates) delegating powers
to agents’ (e.g. EU or its institutions).”251 Further, agency theory may
potentially enhance the understanding of the intricate “divisions of
power within the EU”252 and improve the quality of “normative
debates about the evaluation of . . . [its] institutional structure.”253
The EU has proved a highly fertile ground for research inspired by
agency theory.254 Besides reaffirming its overall validity, the empirical
inquiries undertaken in this context have paved the way for a welcome
shift from system-wide macro-delegation to micro-delegation in
specific policy areas255 and from a heavy concern with internal
explanatory variables for delegation and discretion to a stronger focus
on the environment in which the agent operates (i.e. external
variables).256 In the process, the agent has become more visible as a
significant but not properly configured party to a two-way
relationship, effectively putting paid to the contention that scholars
investigating the structural-functional attributes of international
organizations are preoccupied with principals, offering “a remarkably
thin view of agent behavior.”257
Agency theory has encountered growing challenges in the EU
milieu.258 Notably, it has become increasingly apparent that the
249. Id. at 2.
250. Id.
251. See Delreux & Adriaensen, supra note 228, at 1-2.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See id. (suggesting that “scholarship on the EU will become a breeding
ground for innovative research on using the principal-agent model for the wider
discipline.”).
255. Id. at 8.
256. Id. at 9.
257. Darren G. Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, How Agents Matter, in DELEGATION
AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 199, 199 (Darren G. Hawkins et
al. 2006).
258. See Delreux & Adriaensen, supra note 228, at 12–13 (noting two types of
challenges, the non-hierarchical mode of governance and the exclusive focus on
dyadic relationships).
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hierarchical approach to social interactions, a salient characteristic of
the principal-agent model, no longer comports with EU realities.259
Organizational hierarchies have not been consigned to oblivion, but
they have been complemented with relatively flat policy networks,
leading to the emergence of heterarchical modes of governance. 260
Within such systems there is less scope for multilayered conflict and
more space for forging “cooperative, egalitarian, and reciprocal
relations.”261
By the same token, the EU institutional landscape has undergone
substantial differentiation which has blurred its dyadic (principal
versus agent) layout.262 A multitude of public and private actors have
burst onto the scene,263 rendering the mapping out of the organizational
architecture rather difficult.264 Students of international
relations/positive international legal theory have gone to some lengths
to confront these challenges265 but have recognized that, as matters
stand, gaps remain and that agency theory alone may never provide a
complete answer to all the questions pertaining to the relationship
between States and international organizations.266 The lesson is that
the principal-agent model is a many-sided yet not unrestricted
heuristic which should be “appl[ied] liberally but handle[d] with
care.”267
From a conceptual perspective, the most serious challenge to
agency theory in the international institutional domain has come not
259. See id. at 13 (noting that horizontal, non-hierarchical relations are now
common).
260. See id. at 13 (stating networks do not completely replace hierarchical
relationships).
261. Id.
262. See id. at 12 (asserting that the “two constitutive elements of a principalagent relationship—hierarchy and the dyad—are under pressure in contemporary
politics”).
263. Id. at 13.
264. See Delreux & Adriaensen, supra note 228, at 13 (stating this multitude of
actors makes it more and more difficult to grasp political processes using a dyadic
perspective).
265. See generally id. at 14–16 (suggesting different ways to maximize the utility
of the principal-agent model).
266. See id. at 22 (noting that principal-agent analyses have insufficiently
addressed the challenges brought by critics).
267. Id. at 10.
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within but without the rationalist sphere and has entailed what
amounts to its partial repudiation rather than mere refinement.268
Specifically, Karen Alter, the leading authority on international
judicial behavior who has conducted extensive research on the subject,
concluded that delegation to international courts possesses features
that are not accurately captured by the principal-agent model and that
as a result the relationship between the delegator and delegate in such
settings should be expressed in different terms.269
According to Alter, the aim of delegation to international courts is
to create an organizational platform devoid of political machinations
where law and its strict interpretation reign supreme.270 If this
aspiration is fulfilled in practice, which she postulates to be the case,
delegators’/States’ discretion is given away and the delegates/judges
are free to operate as they see professionally fit.271 This freedom
cannot really be materially curtailed via recontracting (i.e. amending
the contract/redefining nature of delegation), thus calling into question
Paul Stephan’s argument that “[k]nowing that they can be replaced,
the members of [an international] tribunal have an incentive not to do
anything that will upset the countries with nominating authority.”272
Alter builds her thesis on Giandomenico Majone’s distinction
between two types of delegation—one to realize efficiency gains and
the other to bolster the credibility of the principal as well as political
decision-making.273 Where the former prevails, the intention is to
268. Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political
Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L RELS. 33, 54–55 (2018) (challenging the epistemology of
the principal-agent theory; and providing a theoretical explanation for Trustee
independence).
269. See id. at 55 (noting that a different type of politics is at play when States
delegate authority to international courts).
270. See generally Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts and the
Limits of Re-contracting Political Power, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND
DECISIONS) 312, 312–38 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) (commenting on
salary protections and for-cause removal protections that allow for judicial
independence).
271. See id. at 312 (“Principals [intentionally] allow judges to be fired only for
egregious acts unbecoming to their office, and judicial salaries are protected.”).
272. Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification the Agency
Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333, 337 (2002).
273. Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation Agency and Fiduciary
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minimize transaction costs; the agents are thus selected on the basis of
their propensity to comply and the delegation contract is designed to
maximize the principal’s control over them.274 Alter contrasts this with
what she describes as “fiduciary delegation,” or delegation to trustees,
where the purpose is “to convince some third party that [its] interests
are being protected.”275 In such credibility-boosting delegation, “the
best strategy is to delegate to Agents whose values visibly and
systematically differ from [those] of the Principal, to make these
Agents highly independent and to refrain from meddling”276 since “an
Agent bound to follow the directions of the delegating politician could
not possibly enhance the commitment.”277
Majone incisively illustrates how different delegation logics lead to
fundamentally different contract design choices278 (e.g., for trustees,
endeavoring to ensure that they are duly shielded from political
pressure).279 Alter ventures further by asserting that the difference
between agents and trustees extends beyond contract design. 280 In her
view, “[t]he reason certain Agents are chosen, the expectations in
delegation, the actual powers given to the Agents, and the Agent’s
constituency are different in delegation to Trustees, so that the simple
fact of delegation may not result in the author of the contract having
privileged influence over the agent.”281
Alter puts forward credible and illuminating but excessively
formalistic and restrictive observations. The sharp dichotomy between
agent and fiduciary is overstated as, in reality, the dividing line tends
to become somewhat blurred.282 Manfred Elsig and Mark Pollack’s
Relations in EU Governance, 2 EUR. UNION POL. 103, 103 (2001).
274. See Alter, supra note 268, at 38 (rejecting principal-agent analysis).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 39.
277. Majone, supra note 273, at 110.
278. See id. at 103–04.
279. Alter, supra note 268, at 39.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See Manfred Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and International
Courts: The Politics of Judicial Appointment at the World Trade Organization, 20
EUR. J. INT’L RELS. 391, 392 (2014) (claiming that international courts act not as
agents but as trustees who operate beyond the influence of the principals that
appointed them).

530

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:3

empirical exploration of judicial appointments to the Appellate Body
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) over a decade-and- a-half is
particularly telling in this respect.283 The two have painted a picture of
“an Appellate Body appointment process that, far from representing a
pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member[S]tate principals opportunities to influence Appellate Body members
ex ante and possibly ex post.”284 Indeed, this pattern has become
increasingly pronounced over time.285
The findings do not lend unqualified support to the principal-agent
model nor do they decisively undermine the fiduciary-centered
alternative.286 As indicated previously, delegation by States to
international organizations is a complex phenomenon which needs to
be dissected accordingly.287 This means jettisoning mono-causal
accounts and opting for multifaceted explanatory schemes which,
inter alia, incorporate context, feedback loops, and
intervening/mediating variables.288 The balance between agent-like
impulses and their fiduciary (or some other constructivist)
counterparts may turn out to be situation-dependent, but there is no
compelling reason to dethrone agency theory as the dominant
paradigm when it comes to examining delegation via international
institutional channels, provided that its inherent limitations and the
fact that it remains “work-in-progress” are duly acknowledged.289
WHO handling of the incipient coronavirus threat may shed further
light on this issue.

V. ANATOMY OF COVID-19 OUTBREAK
Broadly speaking, standards of healthcare have dramatically
283. See generally id.
284. Id. at 391.
285. Id.
286. See id. at 410 (stating that the findings are limited to the authors’ study of a
relatively brief experience of judicial nomination in a single international court).
287. See Delreux & Adriaensen, supra note 228, at 14 (noting that mapping any
decision-making process is complex).
288. See id. (explaining that while principal-agent theory cannot explain all EU
politics, it may be useful in mapping principal-agent relations, studying the politics
of delegation and studying the politics of discretion).
289. Cf. Alter, supra note 268, at 38 (noting that the principal-agent theory is
intuitively compelling in the EU context).
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improved since the Industrial Revolution but neither to a point of
eradicating physical and psychological ailments nor uniformly across
the globe.290 Many types of disease, illness, and sickness continue to
plague humans (as well as other mammals).291 In fact, progress on that
front has been marked by shortfalls and uneven evolution.292 While
there are many bright spots (e.g. in the field of organ
transplantation),293 there is still no cure for the common cold294 and
several dreaded diseases are staging a worrisome comeback.295 At any
specific juncture, one may discern signs of (primarily) revolution,
(secondarily) stagnation, and even (at least selectively and
temporarily) regression.296
It should be noted that this is an area where scientific discourse is
characterized by a surprising degree of conceptual fuzziness.297
Interrelated notions such as disease, illness, and sickness have evolved
into a loosely configured network.298 Consequently, they are often
used arbitrarily and interchangeably (this is also true for terms such as
290. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 56
72 (1988) (discussing modern improvements in healthcare alongside existing
challenges in modern medicine).
291. See Anna-Henrikje Seidlein & Sabine Salloch, Illness and Disease: An
Empirical-Ethical
Viewpoint,
BMC
MED
ETHICS
(2019),
https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12910-018-0341-y
(discussing the distinction between disease, illness, and sickness).
292. See Carolyn L. Wiener & Anselm L. Strauss, Introduction to the Fifth
Edition, in WHERE MEDICINE FAILS 1, 3 (Carolyn L. Wiener & Anselm L. Strauss
eds., 1997) (discussing inequities in American healthcare delivery, including
disparate access to healthcare and inappropriate distribution of resources).
293. See
generally
Living-Donor
Transplant,
MAYO
CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/living-donor-transplant/about/pac20384787 (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
294. Angus Chen, Why Haven’t We Cured the Common Cold Yet?, SCI.
AMERICAN (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/whyhavent-we-cured-the-common-cold-yet/.
295. See Naveed Saleh, 10 Dreaded Diseases Back from the Brink, MDLINX (Feb.
7, 2019), https://www.mdlinx.com/article/10-dreaded-diseases-back-from-thebrink/lfc-3380 (syphilis, measles, plague, scarlet fever, mumps, gonorrhea,
chlamydia, whooping cough (pertussis), tuberculosis, and gout).
296. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 294 (discussing the discovery of rhinoviruses that
cause the common cold, the biotechnology industry’s failure to create a vaccine, and
the unlikelihood of future advances due to societal challenges).
297. See generally Seidlein & Salloch, supra note 291.
298. See id.
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disability, injury, and malady, among many similar yet less familiar
examples).299 The opacity is not confined to informal communication
and busy professional practice, manifesting itself in the scientific
realm where these three concepts still lack a “standard, normative
meaning.”300
Andrew Twaddle, responsible for introducing that much ruminated
over triad, has defined disease as “physiological malfunction [ . . . ]
independent of subjective experience and social conventions.”301 As
Suzanne Fleischman has pointed out, this controversially “removes
the patient from the pathology.”302 By contrast, according to Twaddle,
illness alludes to “subjectively interpreted undesirable state of
health.”303 Sickness, he suggests, is yet another dimension of ailment,
broadly conceived, showing as “social identity [ . . . ] defined by
others with reference to the social activity of that individual.”304
The corollary is that it is desirable to tread carefully in this vaguely
delineated territory.305 The extent to which analytical precision is
called for, however, clearly depends on circumstances.306 In this
context, it seems to be sufficient to recognize the multifaceted nature
of the phenomenon that is under scrutiny and the ambiguity which it
continues to engender, without endeavoring to firmly adhere to a path
that would fully respect the intricacies and nuances highlighted in the
scientific literature.307 The sole pertinent term employed in the
remainder of this article is thus disease, which nevertheless is assumed
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. (citing ANDREW C. TWADDLE & LENNART NORDENFELT, DISEASE,
ILLNESS AND SICKNESS: THREE CENTRAL CONCEPTS IN THE THEORY OF HEALTH: A
DIALOGUE BETWEEN ANDREW TWADDLE & LENNART NORDENFELT 8 (1994)).
302. Suzanne Fleischman, I am . . . , I have . . . , I suffer from . . . : A Linguistic
Reflects on the Language of Illness and Disease, 20 J. MED. HUMANITIES 3, 7 (1999).
303. ANDREW C. TWADDLE & LENNART NORDENFELT, DISEASE, ILLNESS AND
SICKNESS: THREE CENTRAL CONCEPTS IN THE THEORY OF HEALTH: A DIALOGUE
BETWEEN ANDREW TWADDLE & LENNART NORDENFELT 10 (1994).
304. Id. at 11.
305. See Seidlein & Salloch, supra note 291 (stating that such vague concepts can
be a “bridge or barrier” between medical perspectives).
306. See id. at 3 (noting that patients’ views on their own circumstances are taken
into account to define illness).
307. See id. at 2 (discussing the multifaceted nature of the debate surrounding
disease, illness, and sickness).
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to have psychological and sociological manifestations rather than
merely those of the physiological variety.308
The latter, prevalent and pernicious in the healthcare segment
covered here, are the product of some malfunction of body
mechanisms. After all, “[t]he human body is a complex machine
performing a multitude of functions every day.”309 The implication is
that, like any type of machine, “it can malfunction, possibly as the
result of inherent genetic error, and infection or as a consequence of
lifestyle choices, occupations or environmental exposure to harmful
agents.”310 Such disturbance, in turn, may have far-reaching
psychological and sociological ramifications, although the
relationship may potentially be circular.311
A key distinction in the healthcare sphere is that between infectious
and non-infectious diseases (also known as communicable/CDs and
non-communicable diseases/NCDs).312 The former “can be
transmitted from one person to another”313 (e.g., common cold),
whereas the latter “cannot be spread through person-to-person
contact”314 (e.g., cardiovascular disease). Infectious diseases are
caused by contagious “pathogenic micro-organisms such as bacteria,
viruses, fungi [and] parasites.”315 This type of pathogens are absent in
non-infectious diseases which are triggered by “factors such as
genetics, malnutrition, environment and lifestyle.”316
Historically, infectious diseases accounted for most of the deaths in

308. Id. (citing TWADDLE & NORDENFELT, supra note 303, at 8.).
309. Health & Social Care: Physiological Disorders, CAMBRIDGE TECHNICALS,
https://ocr.org.uk/Images/139876-physiological-disorders.pdf, (last visited on Sept.
30, 2020).
310. Id.
311. See generally Seidlein & Salloch, supra note 291, at 5.
312. See What is the Difference between an Infectious and Non-Infectious
Disease?,
CHILDFUND
AUSTL.,
(June
24,
2020),
https://www.childfund.org.au/stories/what-is-the-difference-between-an-infectiousand-non-infectious-disease/; Erica Cirino, Most Common Noncommunicable
Diseases, HEALTHLINE, (June 13, 2018), https://www.healthline.com/health/noncommunicable-diseases-list.
313. CHILDFUND AUSTL., supra note 312.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.

534

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:3

the world, and this remains the case in some developing regions. 317
Due to advances in pharmacological and pharmaceutical science,
notably the development of antibiotics and vaccination programs, this
is no longer true for developed regions and even parts of the
developing world.318 Non-infectious diseases are currently the leading
cause of death overall, but infectious diseases continue to be a
significant source of loss of life and wreak havoc on people’s physical,
psychological, and socio-economic well-being319 (e.g. the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention/CDC estimate that in the United
States alone “influenza has resulted in between 9 million-45 million
illnesses, between 140,000-hospitalizations and between 12,00061,000 deaths annually since 2010.”320
Infectious diseases vary in their scope. When they affect an
unexpectedly large number of people, they are deemed an outbreak.321
This may be confined to one country or spread over a number of
countries—that is, constitute either an epidemic or a pandemic. 322
While the dichotomy between these two forms of infectious disease
has purely politico-geographic underpinnings, and conceptualizing
and modeling a pandemic is not inherently different from
conceptualizing and modeling an epidemic,323 the former is a multi317. Infectious & Non-Infectious Diseases, LCSNC, (Nov. 18, 2015),
https://www.lcsnc.org/cms/lib010/NC01911169/Centricity/Domain/850/Virus
es%20and%20Bacteria%20Review.pdf.
318. Id.
319. See Andrew P. Dobson & E. Robin Carper, Infectious Diseases and Human
Population History, 46 BIOSCIENCE 115, 124 (1996) (highlighting the
disproportionate impact of infectious diseases in poorer “inner-city populations”);
see also Elaine Larson, Social and Economic Impact of Infectious Diseases-United
States, at 31–31, CLIN. PERFORM. QUAL. HEALTHCARE, (1997) (estimating the
economic costs of infectious disease in the United States). See generally Kristine M.
Smith et al., Infectious Disease and Economics: The Case for Considering MultiSectoral Impacts, 7 ONE HEALTH 1, 1–5 (2019) (detailing the severe economic
impact of zoonotic disease outbreaks).
320. Disease
Burden
of
Influenza,
CDC
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/burden/index.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
321. Pandemics, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/cold-and-flu/what-areepidemics-pandemics-outbreaks#1 (last visited Dec. 10, 2020).
322. See id.; CDC, PRINCIPLES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE
72 (3rd ed. 2012).
323. See How to Model a Pandemic, EARTHSKY (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://earthsky.org/human-world/how-to-model-a-pandemic (explaining the role of
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country concern and thus has much wider managerial, policy, and
scientific implications.324
Humankind has experienced numerous pandemics, some more
crippling and less tractable than others.325 In the contemporary era,
encompassing the 20th and 21st Centuries, the 1918 Spanish Flu, first
reported in Madrid, proved particularly devastating.326 It initially
surfaced in Europe, the United States, and parts of Asia, eventually
engulfing the entire world.327 No effective preventive, mitigating, and
remedial measures were available at the time allowing this killer flu
strain to claim approximately 50 million lives,328 inflict enormous
damage on a global economy rising from the ashes of the First World
War,329 and produce extraordinarily harmful social reverberations that
persisted well after it receded.330
At the turn of the 21st Century, it was broadly thought that serious
worldwide pandemics were a thing of the past, with outbreaks
confined to the periphery of developing regions, sparing developed
ones blessed with cutting-edge medical technologies and robust
healthcare infrastructure.331 This belief was shattered in the wake of
mathematical epidemiology in combatting pandemics including COVID-19).
324. See Esther Versluis et al., Multilevel Regulation of Complex Policy
Problems: Uncertainty and the Swine Flu Pandemic, 5 EUR. POL’Y ANALYSIS 80,
85 (2019) (analyzing the multifaceted challenges to the international response to the
H1N1 pandemic).
325. See generally Pandemics that Changed History, HISTORY (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.history.com/topics/middle-ages/pandemics-timeline (Updated Dec. 21,
2020) (providing an overview of pandemics throughout history).
326. See id. (recounting the death toll of 50 million worldwide, unavailability of
vaccines, and scarcity of body storage in the United States among other
consequences of the pandemic).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See THOMAS A. GARRETT, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE 1918 INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC 7 (2007) (emphasizing the combined, devastating impact of the influenza
outbreak in the aftermath of World War I).
330. See How Epidemics Shape Society, HUB (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/04/09/alexandre-white-how-pandemics-shape-society/
(describing how practices of social distancing and quarantining result in responses
that oppress minority and marginalized groups).
331. See How the 4 Biggest Outbreaks Since the Start of this Century Shattered
Some
Long-Standing
Myths,
WHO
(Sept.
1,
2015),
https://www.who.int/news/item/01-09-2015-how-the-4-biggest-outbreaks-sincethe-start-of-this-century-shattered-some-long-standing-myths.
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the 2003 arrival in Asia of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),
which spread most easily in highly-equipped hospitals and wrought
greatest mayhem in affluent urban areas.332 The 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic that followed had milder clinical manifestations, but it
tellingly demonstrated how rapidly an infectious disease may reach
every corner of the world.333
The 2012 eruption of the Middle East respiratory syndrome
(MERS) exposed yet another crack in the prevailing wisdom regarding
the nature of pandemics in the contemporary era.334 Like SARS, it
turned out to be a predominantly regional phenomenon, and
principally confined to a developing region to boot.335 Yet, the
afflicted area was an atypical low-density one, evincing that a modern
pandemic may originate anywhere or that “[c]amels in an arid desert
setting can also breed surprises.”336 The 2014 return of the EBOLA
virus to a supposedly distant and isolated part of West Africa and the
subsequent extension of its tentacles, to a point whereby it became a
United National Security Council concern, dramatically signaled that
highly disruptive global pandemics are here to stay. 337
The 2019/20 outbreak of COVID-19/ SARS-CoV-2 has
extinguished any remaining illusions with respect to the mutability,
proliferation, range, resilience, and severity of present-day
epidemics.338 While scientific knowledge pertaining to its
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See About MERS, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/about/
index.html (last updated Aug. 2, 2019) (explaining that all MERS cases are linked
to the Arabian Peninsula); see also Jacob Kushner, Why Camels Are Worrying
Coronavirus
Hunters,
BBC
(Jan.
25,
2021)
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20210122-the-coronavirus-10-times-moredeadly-than-covid, (providing an overview of the transmission of MERS from
camels to people since the 2012 outbreak due to the increased use of camels in
herding).
336. See WHO, supra note 331.
337. See id.
338. See David Cyranoski, Profile of a Killer: The Complex Biology Powering
the
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
NATURE
(May
4,
2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01315-7 (describing the danger
coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 poses due to its ability to mutate, spread easily, and attack
a variety of human cells).
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characteristics is still accumulating, a general profile of this extremely
aggressive virus has emerged.339 Researchers have thus determined
that it “has evolved an array of adaptations that make it much more
lethal than the other coronaviruses humanity has met so far.”340 And,
unlike its close relatives, COVID-19 “can readily attack human cells
at multiple points, with the lungs and throat being the main target.” 341
Once it has penetrated the body, COVID-19 “makes use of a diverse
arsenal of dangerous molecules.”342 There is reason to believe that this
deadly virus has been hiding out in nature for decades343 and has
developed the capacity to exploit the body’s defense mechanisms as
well as to fend off internally and externally engineered
counterattacks.344
The full socio-economic impact of COVID-19 is difficult to
estimate at this juncture because such assessment requires peering into
the proverbial crystal ball in the face of great uncertainty.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the heavy toll inflicted on individuals,
groups, and communities has few parallels in modern history.345 As
the staff of the United Nations’ Framework for the Immediate
Response to the COVID-19 Crisis have observed “[t]he COVID-19
pandemic is far more than a health crisis: It is affecting societies and
economies at their core.”346 To make matters worse, much of the
colossal damage may prove to be long-lasting.347
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. See also Aislinn Antrim, Research Suggest COVID-19 Exploits Body’s
Defense
Mechanisms,
PHARMACY
TIMES
(Apr.
28,
2020),
https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/research-suggests-covid-19-exploits-bodysdefense-mechanism, (explaining how SARS-CoV-2 uses the body’s ACE2 receptor
with assistance from the TMPRSS2 enzyme, exploiting one of the primary
biological defenses against viral infections).
345. See
Socio-Economic
Impact,
UNDP,
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/coronavirus/socio-economic-impactof-covid-19.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2021) (emphasizing the impact of COVID-19
on societies, economies, and vulnerable groups along with the currently
unpredictable trajectories for development).
346. Id.
347. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM [WEF], COVID-19 OUTLOOK A
PRELIMINARY MAPPING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 9 (2020) (underlining that in addition
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As indicated, the path forward is clouded.348 A number of scenarios
have been painted, none of them genuinely optimistic.349 Even if—as
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the WHO Director-General, hopes
(but does not necessarily expects)—COVID-19 will be brought firmly
under control by late 2022,350 the total costs—health-related and socioeconomic (including environmental and political); short-term,
medium-term, and long-term—will be massive.351 Any lessons that
may be derived from what has transpired at various stages of the
pandemic’s unfolding may therefore have considerable value.352 The
focus here is on the foot-dragging, lack of transparency,
mismanagement of crucial information, and reluctance to cooperate
fully with “outsiders” witnessed when evidence of SARS-CoV-2
began to emerge in China.353
It is now thought that the first COVID-19 case was detected on
November 17, 2019.354 According to Chinese authorities, the person in
question was one of 226 people who contracted the virus in late 2019
and who came under medical surveillance.355 No meaningful attempts
were made to act on this information via formal or informal channels
until a Wuhan-based 34-year-old ophthalmologist, posted a message
on WeChat on December 30, 2019, alerting fellow professionals to
to public health consequences, the pandemic could have lasting effects on people
and societies through reduced social cohesion and high unemployment).
348. See Cyranoski, supra note 338, at 9 (contrasting the viewpoints of
researchers who believe that COVID-19 will weaken over time and those who
alternatively believe COVID-19 will maintain its same pathogenicity).
349. See id. (detailing how even those who predict that the virus will weaken
believe it will continue spreading in the human population forever).
350. See Coronavirus Pandemic Could Be Over Within Two Years – WHO Head,
BBC (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-53870798 (expressing
hopes that like the Great Influenza, the coronavirus will last less than two years).
351. See WEF, supra note 347, at 9 (discussing the range of economic concerns
as a result of the pandemic and implications for sustainability).
352. See id. at 10 (encouraging the continued collaboration between the public
and private sectors following the COVID-19 pandemic).
353. See Helen Davidson, First Covid-19 Case Happened in November, China
Government Records Show – Report, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/13/first-covid-19-case-happened-innovember-china-government-records-show-report
(recounting
inaccurate
information provided to the World Health Organization by the Chinese government).
354. Id.
355. Id.
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symptoms of a new virus being exhibited by patients in his hospital.356
Dr Li, who succumbed to the disease five weeks later,357 was harshly
reprimanded by the local police for “making false comments” that
severely disturbed the social order, violating in the process the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) Law on Penalties for
Administration of Public Security.358 A high-level investigation into
the mishandling of Dr Li’s exercise of an elementary civic duty,
concluded in late March, culminated in a softly worded
recommendation that the reprimand be withdrawn.359 Not content with
a display of underwhelming restraint, the investigative team proceeded
to excoriate those resorting to anti-establishment labels such as
“awakener” and “hero” to portray Dr Li’s low-key expressions of
concern.360
Interestingly, within 24 hours of this professionally motivated
gentle signaling that a serious health hazard may have surfaced, the
Wuhan Municipal Health Commission acknowledged, albeit in an
understated fashion, the emergence of a cluster of cases of viral
pneumonia of unknown origin in Hubei Province.361 Ten days later,
the Chinese scientific community also started taking tentative steps to
come to grips with this unfamiliar threat, when the gene sequencing
data of SARS-CoV-2 was posted on Virological.org by researchers

356. See
COVID-19
Timeline,
OT&P
HEALTHCARE,
https://www.otandp.com/covid-19-timeline (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) (listing Li
Wenliang’s WeChat message as the beginning of the COVID-19 timeline).
357. Andrew Green,
Li
Wenliang, LANCET (Feb.
18, 2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)303822/fulltext
358. Laney Zhang, FALQs: Spreading Rumors and Police Reprimand Under
Chinese Law, LIBR. CONG. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2020/03/falqsspreading-rumors-and-police-reprimand-under-chinese-law/.
359. Brenda Goh, ‘Is That It?’: Chinese Report into Death of Doctor Who Raised
Coronavirus
Alarm
Underwhelms,
REUTERS
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-doctor/is-that-itchinese-report-into-death-of-doctor-who-raised-coronavirus-alarm-underwhelmsidUSKBN2162RQ.
360. Id.
361. See Archived: WHO Timeline - COVID-19, WHO (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline-covid-19, (dating the
report of the cluster of pneumonia cases as the day following Dr. Li’s message,
December 31, 2019).
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from Shanghai’s Fudan University.362 Little was done at the national
and provincial level until late January, however, to raise public
awareness of the nature of the threat and the risks it poses, even though
they were mostly appreciated at that juncture.363
Indeed, there is evidence that the Chinese authorities deliberately
withheld information containing SARS-CoV-2 genome sequence test
results for as long as two weeks, confirming only on January 20, 2020,
the existence of human-to-human transmission and moving to impose
an hermetic lockdown on Wuhan three days later.364 The surge in local
cases, rising disquiet and countermeasures taken in neighboring
countries and territories (including Hong Kong), mounting
international pressure, and heightened social panic may have brought
about the turnaround.365 Still, the veil of uncertainty was merely
partially lifted, with key features of the situation and operational
positioning remaining undisclosed.366 Notably, the figures pertaining
to the number of cases and deaths continued to arouse skepticism.367
The responsibility for the distortion and suppression of vital
information, as well as the counterproductive and ultimately
362. See COVID-19 Timeline, supra note 356.
363. See Oiwan Lam, China Censors Report About How Authorities Hid
Coronavirus Genome Sequence Test Results for 14 Days, H.K. FREE PRESS (Mar. 7,
2020), https://hongkongfp.com/2020/03/07/china-censors-report-authorities-hidcoronavirus-genome-sequence-test-results-14-days/ (highlighting the fact that
Beijing only acknowledged human-to-human transmission on January 20, 2020).
364. Id.
365. See generally Coronavirus: A Timeline of the Outbreak Related to the
Deadly Sars – September 2020, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/yp/discover/news/global/article/3071167/coronavirustimeline-outbreak-related-deadly-sars-september
(summarizing
the
rising
international panic, mistrust of the Chinese government, and the extensive
countermeasures taken by foreign governments to control the worsening spread of
COVID-19).
366. See James Kynge, Sun Yu, & Tom Hancock, Coronavirus: The Cost of
China’s Public Health Cover-Up, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/fa83463a-4737-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441 (discussing
the Chinese government’s widespread suppression of information regarding the
virus).
367. See id. (recounting how the official count of coronavirus cases did not rise
despite surging infection rates). See generally Coronavirus: Why China’s Claims of
Success Raise Eyebrows, BBC (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-china-52194356 (providing an overview of the general mistrust of the metrics
provided by the Chinese government for both GDP and coronavirus data).
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destabilizing action pursued in the process, was squarely placed on the
shoulders of a handful of municipal and provincial administrators,
none of whom paid a heavy price, personal or professional, for her/his
missteps.368 While Wuhan City and Hubei Province officials doubtless
are directly to blame for the utter mismanagement of the outbreak of
COVID-19, this was not an exclusively subnational experience.369 The
country’s top-leaders, who were subsequently depicted as being at the
forefront of the battle to contain the pandemic,370 were aware of the
incipient crisis by the end of the first week of January but opted to
remain in a passive mode.371
The attention-diverting and energy-sapping propaganda campaign
that followed was clearly spearheaded by strategists at the apex of the
political pyramid.372 It consisted of persistent and systematic attempts
368. See Coronavirus: Senior Chinese Officials ‘Removed’ As Death Toll Hits
1,000, BBC (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china51453848 (highlighting the fact that “removal” from office can simply constitute a
demotion and mentioning that other punishments assessed to officials included “a
serious intra-Party warning” and a “serious administrative demerit”); Wuhan
Officials Punished for Failing to Report Suspected Case That Led to Patient’s
Death,
GLOB.
TIMES
(Feb.
16,
2020),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1179742.shtml (listing punishments assessed to
four administrative officials as including criticism, warnings and “a reshuffle”); see
also China Penalizes Derelict Officials in Coronavirus Fight, XINHUANET (Feb. 5,
2020),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/05/c_138755872.htm
(identifying government officials in Hubei Province and Wuhan as “unqualified and
derelict officials”).
369. See Shanshan Wang & James Griffiths, Xi Jinping Says He Knew About the
Virus
Outbreak
in
Early
January,
CNN
(Feb.
15,
2020),
https://edition.cnn.com/asia/live-news/coronavirus-outbreak-02-16-20-intlhnk/h_73978cf29de20883108a0d9d0b045e71 (acknowledging that Xi Jinping had
known about COVID-19 as Wuhan officials downplayed the virus’ danger).
370. See President Xi Leads China’s War Against COVID-19, CHINADAILY (Mar.
6, 2020), https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/123491 (praising President Xi for
taking “command of China’s war against the COVID-19 epidemic”).
371. See Wang et al., supra note 369 (highlighting that President Xi ordered
measures to prevent and control COVID-19 on January 7th); see also Hilton Yip,
Make No Mistake, This is Xi Jinping’s Coronavirus, H.K. FREE PRESS (Mar. 8,
2020),
https://hongkongfp.com/2020/03/08/make-no-mistake-xi-jinpingscoronavirus/ (asserting that the Chinese authorities’ concealment of COVID-19 in
the initial weeks of the outbreak exacerbated the virus’ spread).
372. See Yip, supra note 371 (citing a compilation of States writing to
congratulate President Xi and Chinese leadership’s response to the virus that was
recently published as a book).
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to shift from defense to offense, endeavoring to exonerate China of
any wrongdoing and framing others for being at fault for triggering
this chain of profoundly costly events.373 Among the more extravagant
claims officially made was the contention that SARS-CoV-2
originated neither from a Wuhan wet market nor from a People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) laboratory in the city but was brought to the
country by American participants in the Military World Games, held
in Wuhan in October 2019.374
While confronting the COVID-19 challenge, particularly in the
early stages of the process, China went to great lengths to keep
outsiders at an arm’s length.375 Calls for an international investigation
into the origins of the pandemic were resisted and, when provisionally
accommodated, resistance gave way to stalling.376 Access to crucial
information and key locations was either denied or not granted, with
the Wuhan area, the epicenter of the crisis, made virtually beyond
reach.377 Any constructive American involvement was ruled out on the
373. See Laura Rosenberger, China’s Coronavirus Information Offensive: Beijing
is Using New Methods to Spin the Coronavirus Pandemic to its Advantage, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-0422/chinas-coronavirus-information-offensive; see also James Palmer, Chinese
Officials Can’t Help Lying About the Wuhan Virus, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 3. 2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/03/wuhan-coronavirus-coverup-lies-chineseofficials-xi-jinping/ (citing the Chinese government’s pledge to be more transparent
with the WHO and instruction of a whistleblower hotline through WeChat); Denny
Roy, Did COVID-19 Really Give China a Strategic Advantage?, DIPLOMAT (July
22, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/did-covid-19-really-give-china-astrategic-advantage/ (citing Chinese government propaganda attempts to praise
China’s response while highlighting the United States’ failures).
374. Henry Austin & Alexander Smith, Coronavirus: Chinese Official Suggests
U.S. Army is to Blame for Outbreak, NBC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/coronavirus-chinese-official-suggests-u-sarmy-blame-outbreak-n1157826.
375. See Mercy A. Kuo, Investigating China: COVID-19 and the CCP,
DIPLOMAT (May 19, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/investigating-chinacovid-19-and-the-ccp/ (citing the reluctance of local and national authorities to
report the initial outbreak, acknowledge the resulting deaths in Wuhan, or share
uncensored information with the international community).
376. See Coronavirus: China Rejects Call for Probe Into Origins of Disease, BBC
(Apr.
24,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52420536
(explaining the Chinese government’s argument that allowing international
investigators would divert focus from fighting COVID-19).
377. See Jeremy Page & Natasha Khan, On the Ground in Wuhan, Signs of China
Stalling Probe of Coronavirus Origins, WSJ (May 12, 2020),
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grounds that the United States was not an impartial observer but intent
on turning this painful episode to its geopolitical advantage. 378
Cooperation with the WHO was also incomplete and predominantly
on Chinese terms.379
This behavioral pattern is not without recent precedent. 380 The
handling of the 2003 SARS pandemic displayed similar early-stage
disorganization, poor accountability and transparency, rejection of
outside participation, and strategically inspired political
maneuvering.381 Both incidents compellingly demonstrate that the
regime places its stability and survival above all else, although its
problem management may in fact prove to be detrimental to the
fulfillment of these overarching goals.382 The preoccupation with
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-stalls-global-search-for-coronavirus-originswuhan-markets-investigation-11589300842 (detailing Chinese officials’ reluctance
in permitting international officials from accessing the Huanan market, in Wuhan,
China).
378. See K.J.M. Varma, China Rejects Donald Trump’s Demand to Allow U.S.
Team
to
Probe
Coronavirus,
MINT
(Apr.
20,
2020),
https://www.livemint.com/news/world/china-rejects-donald-trump-s-demand-toallow-us-team-to-wuhan-to-probe-coronavirus-11587383543120.html (presenting
China’s argument that it is a victim and not a culprit and that the U.S. was not held
accountable for either the 2008 financial crisis or the 2009 breakout of H1N1
influenza); see also Renee DiResta, For China, the ‘U.S.A. Virus’ Is a Geopolitical
Ploy,
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
11,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/chinas-covid-19-conspiracytheories/609772/ (describing the information war between the U.S. and China on
COVID-19’s origin as significant political brinksmanship).
379. See Christian Shepherd et al., Failure by WHO Team to Visit Wuhan Sparks
Concerns
over
Virus
Probe,
FIN.
TIMES
(Aug.
26,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/f9dea077-66fb-4734-9d1d-076dc93568e1 (observing
the two-person WHO team tasked with investigating the coronavirus origins failed
to even visit Wuhan, the Chinese city where the first cases were detected).
380. See Kelly-Leigh Cooper, China Coronavirus: The Lessons Learned from the
S.A.R.S. Outbreak, BBC (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiachina-51221394 (noting the Chinese government’s evasiveness regarding the 2003
SARS outbreak).
381. See Yanzhong Huang, The SARS Epidemic and its Aftermath in China: A
Political Perspective, in LEARNING FROM S.A.R.S.: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT
DISEASE OUTBREAK 116, 120 21, 123 25, 129 (Knobler et al. eds., 2004),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK92462/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK92462.pdf
(outlining deficiencies with the handling of the SARS outbreak to include a
government-controlled media prohibition on reporting on the WHO’s first global
warning about SARS).
382. See Mercy A. Kuo, Investigating China: COVID-19 and the CCP,
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keeping a tight rein on society and the tendency to shut doors to
outsiders become particularly pronounced at times of militarily or
physically induced stress because “[t]hroughout Chinese history,
epidemic, war, and natural disasters, including famine, had been seen
as signs indicating the loss of the Mandate of Heaven that inexorably
led to the downfall of many dynasties.”383
The COVID-19 experience in China offers three lessons for
scholars exploring the performance of international organizations
from a principal-agent angle. First, the heavy emphasis on the agent
as the source of collective action failures384 is misplaced as the
responsibility may well lie with a principal or a group of principals.
Second, it is insufficient to merely recognize that principals’ (or, for
that matter, agents’) objectives may vary or be time inconsistent.385
The reason is that this specific case abundantly evinces that the
delegation by a State to an international organization may in practice
be conditional, or contingent on some critical— albeit possibly illdefined from a contractual perspective—national goals not being
undermined.386
Third, as a byproduct of clinging to the “unitary actor
hypothesis”,387 in the economic analysis of international law,
DIPLOMAT (May 19, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/investigating-chinacovid-19-and-the-ccp/ (asserting that politics and health are inextricably linked
because improving people’s health is a central tool used by the Chinese Communist
Party to establish political legitimacy).
383. Id.
384. See Adam Kamradt-Scott, WHO’s to Blame? The World Health
Organization and the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, 37 THIRD WORLD Q.
401, 407–10, 412 (2016) (arguing several fundamental structural factors contribute
to WHO issues which trace back to its principal-agent relationship with member
States).
385. See Daniel L. Nelson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International
Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241, 245,
256, 262 (2003) (observing significant institutional reforms and intervention by
member governments take place if and only if an international organization stray
from its principals’ objectives).
386. See Erica R. Gould, Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and
International Monetary Fund Conditionality, 57 INT’L ORGS. 551, 553, 558 (2003)
(demonstrating supplementary financiers are able and willing to influence the terms
of International Monetary Fund agreements).
387. See Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and
the Ground of International Relations, 1 FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 2 (describing
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principals’ and agents’ preferences, which are often fluid and
indeterminate, loom excessively large but their structures, which are
typically resilient and graspable, are inappropriately relegated to the
periphery.388 The point is that, appearances to the contrary, the Chinese
politico-bureaucratic system is splintered to such an extent that it has
been labeled as “fragmented authoritarianism.”389 Within this
ideologically rigid but loosely connected network, actors cannot freely
exercise either exit or voice and place a high premium on the
remaining option of loyalty, distorting and suppressing any signs of
malfunctioning which are perceived as politically destabilizing and
threatening.390 Such structural flaws may have materially contributed
to a key principal’s communication, diagnostic, prognostic, and
relationship failures in the momentous coronavirus crisis.391

the “unitary actor hypothesis” as the international relations theory that a decisionmaking unit can be approximated as a unitary rational actor).
388. See Erin R. Graham, International Organizations as Collective Agents:
Fragmentation and the Limits of Principal Control at the World Health
Organization, 20 EUR. J. INT’L RELS. 366, 368–69 (2014) (explaining that an
international organization’s structural matters including design, leadership, culture,
and expertise significantly impact its behavior).
389. See Andrew Mertha & Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Introduction, in CHINESE
POLITICS AS FRAGMENTED AUTHORITARIANISM: EARTHQUAKES, ENERGY, AND
ENVIRONMENT 1, 2–4 (Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard ed., 2017) [hereinafter CHINESE
POLITICS] (utilizing “fragmented authoritarianism” to describe the framework for
understanding policymaking and implementation in China where power is easily
manipulated by self-interested institutional actors).
390. See Francis Fukuyama, Reflections on Chinese Governance, 1 J. CHINESE
GOVERNANCE 379, 386–87 (2016) (attributing the high levels of corruption in China
to the fact that officials are only accountable to senior leadership of the CCP, rather
than their citizen victims).
391. See Li Yuan, Coronavirus Crisis Shows China’s Governance Failure, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/business/chinacoronavirus-government.html (outlining China’s failures as a result of an opaque
bureaucratic system where officials are fearful to anger their superiors); see also
Zeynep Tufekci, How the Coronavirus Revealed Authoritarianism’s Fatal Flaw,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
22,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/02/coronavirus-andblindness-authoritarianism/606922/ (referencing authoritarian blindness as a
significant problem with China’s top-down administration).
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VI. THE WHO’S RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19
CHALLENGE: TIPTOEING OR GLIDING THROUGH
A HALF-OPEN DOOR?
The fast-expanding literature on new and reemerging infectious
diseases lays a heavy emphasis on their global dimensions and the
overwhelming need for credible international cooperation in
combating them.392 The United States Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention defines these ailments as “diseases of infectious origin
whose incidence in humans has increased within the past two decades
or threatens to increase in the near future.”393 The WHO has affirmed
that such health hazards “represent a global threat that will require a
coordinated, global response.”394 The threat is patently global because
a readily transmissible infectious disease may emerge anywhere on the
planet and spread instantaneously to other parts of the world through
trade and travel.395
392. See Eduardo Lazcano-Ponce et al., The Contribution of International
Agencies to the Control of Communicable Diseases, 36 ARCH. MED. RSCH. 731, 734
(2005) (outlining how globalization has had repercussions on international health
and why cooperation among countries is vital given this global backdrop); see also
David P. Fidler, Globalization, International Law, and Emerging Infectious
Diseases, 2 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 77, 77–78 (1996) (emphasizing the
global nature of new and remerging infectious diseases); Jessie Huang & Deepesh
Vendoti, The Fight Against Infectious Diseases: Considerations for Public Health
Systems and International Cooperation, OBSERVER RSCH. FOUND. OCCASIONAL
PAPER (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-fight-againstinfectious-diseases-considerations-for-public-health-systems-and-internationalcooperation-53965/ (reiterating the need for global efforts to contain and eradicate
diseases following the 2018 and 2019 Ebola outbreaks in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo).
393. Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease Threats: A Prevention Strategy for
the
United
States,
CDC,
at
2
(Apr.
15,
1994),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr4305.pdf [hereinafter CDC REPORT].
394. Communicable Disease Prevention and Control: New, Emerging, and ReEmerging
Infectious
Diseases,
WHO,
at 2 (Feb.
22, 1995),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/177496/WHA48_15_eng.pdf?seq
uence=1&isAllowed=y [hereinafter WHO REPORT].
395. See Eduardo Lazcano-Ponce et al., The Contribution of International
Agencies to the Control of Communicable Diseases, 36 ARCH. MED. RES. 731, 734
(2005) (noting globalization’s many repercussions on international health, including
dissemination of infectious diseases and greater reach for bioterrorism); see also
Fidler, supra note 392, at 77–78 (Globalization has affected public health by (1)
shrinking the world through technological and economic interdependence; (2)
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COVID-19, more than any other recent pandemic, has categorically
highlighted the wide geographic manifestations of emerging and
reemerging infectious diseases and the utmost necessity of resolutely
pursuing international collaboration when devising and implementing
strategies to contain them.396 The scientific view is that, at a minimum,
this should entail duly coordinated joint efforts to scale up medical
capacity for treatment and testing; to develop and deploy safe and
workable vaccines; to maintain surveillance to detect reemergence of
the virus; and to consistently provide strong support for developing
countries.397 Beyond that, concrete steps should be taken to
collectively calibrate fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, as well as
bolster preparedness for future pandemics and related risks.398
Interestingly, like its predecessors, notably SARS,399 the COVID19 debacle has also prompted a normatively and practically driven
examination of its implications for international law in general 400 and
intensifying economic competition by developing a global market; and (3)
encouraging public health programs to go global. ); Huang & Vendoti, supra note
392 (arguing that global efforts are needed to contain and eradicate Ebola).
396. See Norihiro Kokudo & Haruhito Sugiyama, Call for International
Cooperation and Collaboration to Effectively Tackle the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2
GLOB. HEALTH MED. 60, 61 (2020) (stating that international cooperation and
coordination are essential to tackling the COVID-19 pandemic). But see John West,
C.O.V.I.D.-19 a Grim Reminder that International Cooperation Needs to Step Up.
Now, UNRAVEL, (Apr. 06, 2020), https://unravel.ink/covid-19-a-grim-reminderthat-international-cooperation-needs-to-step-up-now-2/ (claiming that the COVID19 crisis had accelerated unfortunate trends in international relations including a rise
in nationalism in many countries and a growing contest for global power between
China and the U.S.).
397. See Aida Caldera & Shashwat Koirala, Eight Priorities to Strengthen
International Cooperation Against C.O.V.I.D.-19, VOX E.U., (June 30, 2020),
https://voxeu.org/article/eight-priorities-strengthen-international-cooperationagainst-covid-19 (highlighting priorities to strengthen international cooperation
against COVID-19 including scaling up treatment and testing along with vaccine
development and deployment).
398. Id.
399. See generally Lazcano-Ponce et al., supra note 392, at 733 (severe acute
respiratory syndrome or SARS is an atypical pneumonia that originated in the
Guangdong province of China in 2002); Fidler, supra note 392, at 77 78 (explaining
how globalization has affected public health); Huang & Vendoti, supra note 392
(asserting that the SARS outbreak provoked fear in the global community).
400. See Francisco-Jose Quintana & Justina Uriburu, Modest International Law:
COVID-19, International Legal Responses, and Depoliticization, 114 AM. J. INT’L
L. 687, 687 88 (2020) (analyzing international legal scholars’ contributions and
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in specific areas in particular.401 Two concerns have loomed
particularly large in the ongoing inquiry into gaps in the international
legal façade and possible remedies thereto: (a) Nature and limits of
State responsibility, in light of China’s seemingly obstructive actions,
and (b) the broadly observed, albeit in authoritarian settings more than
others, extension of executive authority and the concomitant
displacement of human rights on the domestic front, a trend falling
within the purview of international law.402
Overall, this is a multifaceted agenda that cannot be fruitfully
addressed by a single body. Indeed, a decentralized approach may
conceivably yield greater benefits than a centralized one, because it is
impractical to accommodate so many diverse issues within an
overarching framework.403 Moreover, in confronting an existential
challenge such as that posed by COVID-19, the various components
of the policy agenda cannot be considered equal, in terms of the
immediate attention called for.404 Without doubt, the health side of the
picture should be accorded the highest priority and the WHO is the
institutional vehicle that has been created to serve as an international
platform for fulfilling this purpose.405
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic).
401. See Pieter Bekker, International Law in Times of Crisis: COVID19 and
Foreign
Investments,
LEXOLOGY,
(May
4,
2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c8c46035-4e4f-4f9f-8f1666b23b5942a0 (discussing international law safeguards for foreign investments and
the economy).
402. See Quintana & Uriburu, supra note 400, at 687–88 (framing the responses
and causes of the COVID-19 outbreak through the lens of State responsibility and
China’s failure to comply with obligations).
403. See Brigit Toebes, International Health Law: An Emerging Field of Public
International Law, 55 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 299, 323 (2015) (arguing the protection and
promotion of health involves a multi-stakeholder approach and a shared
responsibility).
404. See Golam Rasul, A Framework for Improving Policy Priorities in
Managing COVID-19 Challenges in Developing Countries, 8 FRONTIERS PUB.
HEALTH 1, 2, 4 (2020) (suggesting leadership is critically important for addressing
a health crisis in order to coordinate actions among many stakeholders).
405. See JAVED SIDDIQI, WORLD HEALTH AND WORLD POLITICS: THE WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND THE U.N. SYSTEM 194, 196 (1995) (“The
contemporary WHO concept of primary healthcare, which emphasizes the
establishment of efficient general health services that meet at least the basic
minimum health requirements of a country’s inhabitants. Virtually every program of
the WHO has been altered to fit the overall goals of primary health-care.”); see also
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Ad-hoc and systematic intergovernmental attempts to manage
health problems within and across borders date back to the Industrial
Revolution, which heightened elite awareness of the physical and
psychological impact of large-scale production and surging
international trade volumes.406 The search for a viable international
institutional apparatus began shortly thereafter but did not bear fruit
until the early 20th Century, and merely partially so because the
entities established then typically had a narrowly focused mission, a
limited organizational capacity, and a fragile international
foundation.407 An institutional configuration basically commensurate
with the needs of a complex and dynamic, yet fractured and
vulnerable, global community only emerged following the creation of
the WHO, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the
International Labor Organization (ILO) in the late 1940s.408
As matters stand, the WHO has a sweeping vision reflecting its
KELLEY LEE, THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) 1, 99–100 (2009)
(noting that the WHO has had opportunities “to assert its leadership and re-establish
itself as the world’s health organization” especially when “public health has never
been higher on the policy agendas of world leaders”); MARCOS CUETO ET AL., THE
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION: A HISTORY 1 (2019) (suggesting the creation of
the WHO in 1948 merged four functions into a single organization: centralized
epidemiological surveillance, campaigns against epidemics, disease control, and
health system reform).
406. See generally SIDDIQI, supra note 405, at 193 (identifying international
health organizations from 1851 through present day); LEE, supra note 405, at 1–2
(describing the history of modern public health and the growth of international health
cooperation in the early nineteenth century); CUETO ET AL., supra note 405, at 6
(outlining the formation of institutionalized international health in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries).
407. See SIDDIQI, supra note 405, at 193 (explaining what little attention was paid
to public health as a whole in the early 1900s focused on the diseases which caused
the most social, political, and economic havoc); see also LEE, supra note 405, at 2,
4–6 (referencing the overlap and rivalry between separate international health
organizations in the 1900s); CUETO ET AL., supra note 405, at 6 (identifying the Pan
American Sanitary Bureau, the League of Nations Health Organization, and other
entities which came to prominence following cholera pandemics of the 1850s).
408. See SIDDIQI, supra note 405, at 193–94 (noting the WHO inherited an
emphasis from its predecessor organizations on epidemiological reporting and the
practice of offering expert medical advice to countries that sought it); see also David
P. Fidler, The Challenges of Global Health Governance 4 (May 24, 2010) (Council
on Foreign Rels., Working Paper) https://www.cfr.org/report/challenges-globalhealth-governance (explaining the WHO, established in 1948, defined health
broadly and viewed health as central to human dignity).
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aspiration to play a leading role in paving the way for an environment
where every person may enjoy a healthy and productive life, including
ready access to basic health services; where health needs and
healthcare are placed at the center of the global agenda; and where
fruitful cooperation with countries and partners is sustained on an
ongoing basis.409 In more concrete terms, the WHO’s present goal is
“to ensure that a billion more people have universal health coverage,
to protect a billion more people from health emergencies, and [to]
provide a further billion people with better health and well-being.”410
In its quest for universal health coverage, the WHO focuses on
primary healthcare in order to improve access to good-quality
essential services; implements measures to tap sources of funding and
furnish financial protection; endeavors to facilitate access to essential
medicines and health products; offers training to health workers and
professional advice regarding labor policies; lends support to efforts
to encourage people’s participation in the formulation and execution
of national health policies; and takes steps to enhance the effectiveness
health data, information, and monitoring systems.411
In contending with health emergencies, the WHO seeks to identify,
mitigate, and manage health risks; to prevent them from escalating and
develop tools for dealing with outbreaks; to spot and react to pressing
health emergencies; and to support smooth delivery of vital health
services in challenging situations.412 And in its pursuit of better health
and well-being, the WHO aims to determine the social determinants
of these outcomes; to encourage intersectoral approaches to health
problems; and to bring about an attitudinal constellation conducive to
according a high priority to health across the entire policy spectrum.413
In the process of addressing these broad and wide-ranging
objectives, the WHO pays a close attention to human capital formation

409. See
Vision
Statement
by
WHO
Director-General,
WHO,
https://www.who.int/director-general/vision [hereinafter Vision Statement]
(adopting a science-led, innovation-based approach that is result-oriented and fosters
inclusive partnerships).
410. What We Do, WHO, https://www.who.int/about/what-we-do.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
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(“thick” version)414 during all stages of the life cycle.415 This extends
to the daily performance of specific tasks geared toward the prevention
of non-communicable diseases; ongoing promotion of various
manifestations of mental health; minimizing the adverse consequences
of climate change in developing countries; lessening antimicrobial
resistance; and curtailing the spread of high-impact communicable
diseases and ideally eradicating them altogether.416
The WHO’s aspirational, expansive, and focused mission reflects
its status as the international community’s foremost intergovernmental
health body, entrusted with substantial powers to tackle global health
challenges.417 Its standing is further buttressed by virtue of being the
United Nations’ first specialized agency and operating on a scale
unmatched by the majority of its counterparts.418 In 1946, when the
WHO’s Constitution was signed by 61 States, the document was
acclaimed by the United States Surgeon General as the “magna carta
of world health,” “a great ideological victory,” and “an international
declaration of the rights of man to health.”419 No other similar
institutional entity is equally suited for serving as a platform for
realizing “the highest possible level of health,” according to the
414. See Benjamin F. Jones, The Human Capital Stock: A Generalized Approach,
104 AM. ECON. REV. 3752, 3771 (2014) (explaining human capital accounting uses
the assumption that the productivity advantage of human capital is inferred by
comparing productivity of those with more human capital versus those with less);
see also Benjamin F. Jones, The Well-Being of Nations: The Role of Human and
Social Capital, at 20, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/site/worldforum/33703702.pdf
(noting human capital formation takes place in formal education programs, informal
interactions with others, and through self-reflection).
415. See What We Do, supra note 410 (reiterating the WHO’s practice of
addressing human capital).
416. Id.
417. See Allyn L. Taylor, Global Governance, International Health Law and
W.H.O.: Looking Towards the Future, 80 WHO BULLETIN 975, 977–78 (2002),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/71663/80%2812%29975980.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (arguing a large role for the WHO is essential
for implementing health law because of its leadership in coordinating codification
and its ability to actively participate in treaty efforts).
418. See JEREMY YOUDE, CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE
ACTORS 78–79 (2018) (explaining the WHO’s key roles in current global health
governance as leader, facilitator, and information disseminator are an extension of
its legitimacy and near-universal membership).
419. Thomas Parran & Frank G. Boudreau, The World Health Organization:
Cornerstone of Peace, 36 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1267, 1267, 1269, 1271–72 (1946).
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WHO’s Constitution,420 which endows this “premier global health
leader”421 with far-reaching normative authority422 to carry out its
three-dimensional role as an inspirational leader, consensus builder,
and information disseminator.423
Unfortunately, fulfilling this lofty vision, embodying fiduciary-like
expectations, has proved to be an elusive pursuit.424 The performance
shortfall has largely been attributed to common organizational
pathologies.425 Bureaucratic rigidities have thus been invoked to
account for the slow response by WHO to the Thai government’s
request to provide ready access to essential medicines.426 Additionally,
institutional inertia has been identified as the factor responsible, inter
alia, for the lack of vigorous support for the Commission on Social
Determinants of Health and related initiatives.427 These fundamental
420. See WHO, CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, at 2 (July
22, 1946) https://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf [hereinafter
WHO CONST.] (identifying the WHO’s objective as attaining the highest possible
level of health for all peoples).
421. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 104 (2014) (arguing the
WHO’s constitution unmistakably establishes it as the premier global health leader).
422. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Normative Authority of the World Health
Organization, 129 PUB. HEALTH 854, 855 (2015) (discussing the extensive
normative powers within Article 2 of the WHO’s constitution).
423. See YOUDE, supra note 418, at 78–79 (stating the WHO’s key roles include
being a normative leader, facilitator, and information disseminator).
424. See SIDDIQI, supra note 405, at 200–01, 206, 211 (highlighting issues with
the WHO’s effectiveness in eradicating malaria due to negative politics despite
organizational efforts focused on decentralization and universal membership); see
also LEE, supra note 405, at 99–100, 106, 127 (discussing the contentious times
faced by the WHO beginning in the 1990s as a result of political, economic, and
ideological forces at play); CUETO ET AL., supra note 405, at 320, 339 (arguing the
WHO’s very legitimacy as an international health agency was questioned in the
twenty-first century due to its lack of flexibility and the proliferation of non-State
actors, the relative disempowerment of Nation States, and the growing hegemony of
global caretaker organizations such as the IMF and WTO).
425. See Suwit Wibulpolprasert & Mushtaque Chowdhury, World Health
Organization: Overhaul or Dismantle?, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1910, 1910 (2016)
(referencing poor leadership and a lack of leverage when negotiating with powerful
actors such as the WTO as significant challenges).
426. See id. (suggesting the WHO’s stultifying bureaucratic structure is due to
risk averse bureaucrats who enjoy lucrative benefit packages).
427. See id. (citing a woman-focused development program which improved child
mortality rates initiated by the WHO that will fade away without coordinated action
and a concerted effort to rally other actors).

2021]

THE CHALLENGE OF COVID-19

553

deficiencies amply manifested themselves during the H1N1 pandemic,
when innate bureaucratic caution prompted the WHO to overplay the
risks and propel States to unnecessarily spend vast amounts of money
on vaccines, and the Ebola crisis, which featured costly foot-dragging
and timidity by the WHO.428 Poor financial transparency has resulted
in further complications, impeding progress on key fronts.429
Such malperformance has not gone unnoticed and has not been
without adverse consequences.430 Notably, the WHO’s shortcomings
have led to an erosion of its status as a global health leader and the
emergence of serious competitors/complementors such as the World
Bank, the Global Fund, properly resourced development agencies,
private foundations, and other fast-growing global health partnership
programs.431 This, coupled with the inevitable loss of reputational
capital, has diminished the leverage that the WHO has been able to
employ as a major actor in the global arena and its capacity to engage
in productive exchanges with powerful players like the WTO.432
The COVID-19 outbreak and its reverberations have paved the way
for the WHO’s return into the epicenter of the global health arena as a
would-be strategically positioned pacesetter, coordinator, and
information disseminator.433 Once more, however, the exigencies that
have materialized have exposed its weaknesses, external as well as
internal, as a fiduciary-cum-agent.434 Importantly, the WHO failed the
428. See id. at 1910–11 (accusing the WHO of overplaying the danger of the
H1N1 pandemic to member States who spent billions of dollars on unused vaccines).
429. See id. at 1911 (proposing the WHO’s lack of transparency is related to its
dependence on donors and practice of toeing the line of donors’ interests rather than
following its own agenda).
430. See id. at 1910–11 (identifying competitors such as the World Bank, the
Global Fund, and the World Trade Organization).
431. See Wibulpolprasert & Chowdhury, supra note 425, at 1911.
432. Id.
433. See Bonnie Jenkins & Bruce Jones, Reopening the World: The W.H.O.,
International Institutions, and the C.O.V.I.D.-19 Response, BROOKINGS (June 16,
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/16/reopeningthe-world-the-who-international-institutions-and-the-covid-19-response/
(describing the WHO’s pivotal operational role in the world’s COVID-19 response
due to its practice of coordinating scientific work and distributing information to
member countries that lack an equivalent to the U.S. CDC).
434. See id. (associating the WHO’s coordination struggles regarding COVID-19
to its status as a scientific monitoring and advisory body rather than an operational
one).
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test of being adequately prepared and duly equip its stakeholders for a
devastating pandemic—a high-priority task for the institution.435 It
recklessly turned a blind eye to disquieting signs that symptoms of a
new infectious disease were detected in Wuhan in late 2019 and
merrily went along with Chinese reassurances that there was no cause
for concern.436
The primary reason for this remarkable display of nonchalance in
the face of what has turned out to be a massive shock to the global
health and socio-economic regimes was external or political rather
than internal or structural.437 Specifically, the warnings originated
from a “reliable but awkward source.”438 This happened to be Taiwan,
a veritable model to other members of the international community in
terms of its highly effective response to and handling of the COVID19 threat.439 Despite boasting a robust preventive and remedial
healthcare system, Taiwan is locked out of the WHO at China’s
insistence and any indications of potential distress with cross-border
implications it may furnish ineluctably fall on deaf WHO ears.440
It should be noted that the WHO’s adherence to the Chinese line
extended beyond the initial signal interpretation phase of coming to
435. See generally Lawrence Freedman, How The World Health Organization’s
Failure to Challenge China over Coronavirus Cost Us Dearly, NEW STATESMAN
(Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.newstatesman.com/world/asia/2020/04/how-worldhealth-organisation-s-failure-challenge-china-over-coronavirus-cost-us (last visited
Sept. 30, 2020) (highlighting the cost to Japan due to the postponement of the 2020
Tokyo Olympics; and leveling blame towards the WHO for failing to adequately
prepare for one of the organization’s top priorities).
436. Id. (criticizing the WHO’s endorsement of the Chinese reassurances that no
evidence of human-to-human transmission because governments around the world
took note of that endorsement).
437. Id. (paraphrasing Mr. Taro Aso, the Japanese Deputy Prime Minister’s,
criticism of external Chinese influences on the WHO).
438. Id. (highlighting the Taiwanese advance warning to the WHO regarding the
spread of the novel coronavirus, in addition to Taiwan’s successes in limiting the
spread of the virus despite being the island off the coast of China and not being
recognized as a distinct political entity at the insistence of China).
439. Id. (discussing Taiwan’s success in limiting the spread of coronavirus,
resulting in only 363 cases and 5 deaths, in an island country with a population of
24 million).
440. Id. (noting that China’s insistence on nonrecognition of Taiwan as a distinct
political entity has resulted in Taiwan’s success not being recognized on the WHO
website).
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grips with the unfolding crisis in Wuhan.441 Official reassurances
emanating from Beijing continued to be willingly embraced as the
situation escalated and the picture became less cloudy.442 Perhaps most
disturbingly, on January 14th, 2020, the WHO affirmed China’s
contention, based on its “preliminary investigation,” that although this
might be another manifestation of animal-to-human transmission of a
viral infection, periodically encountered in Chinese wet markets,
where trading in wild animals regularly takes place, there was no
compelling evidence of human-to-human transmission.443 This was a
stance known to be unfounded by those closely engaged in monitoring
the emerging threat and endeavoring to devise strategies to deal with
it.444
A week later, on January 22nd, the WHO’s emergency committee
was convened via a teleconference to determine whether the “novel
coronavirus 2019” qualified as a “Public Health Emergency of
International Concern” (PHEIC), the highest possible level of distress
short of a pandemic.445 Diverse views were expressed by the
participants, who concluded that it did not amount to such.446 A day
later, the Chinese authorities appeared to change their tone and began
to move decisively to contain the Wuhan crisis.447 The emergency
committee could not overlook this seeming turnabout and reconvened
on the same day to reassess the situation in light of the change in policy
climate as well as the growing signs (even if understated) indicative
of the scale of the problem and its spread across national borders. 448
Still, as Beijing’s posture remained shrouded in some uncertainty, the
WHO, uneasy about rocking the proverbial boat, opted for an
“intermediate level of alert” rather than a PHEIC.449
441. See Freedman, supra note 435 (while ignoring Taiwan’s warning regarding
the threat of COVID-19 to the global community).
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. See Freedman, supra note 435 (The WHO emergency committee met on
January 23, 2020 to review the spread of the virus not only in China, but also in
Japan, South Korea, and Thailand.).
449. Id. (because the committee found the extent of human-to-human
transmission unclear).
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At that point, alarm bells started ringing in other countries.450 United
States intelligence agencies cautioned President Donald Trump that,
notwithstanding reassurances from his Chinese counterpart, China
was downplaying the gravity of the situation.451 In parallel, major
airlines proceeded to contemplate measures to ban flights from
Wuhan.452 Yet, when first Italy (after coming across infected travelers
from the city) and then the United States actually took this step, the
WHO Director-General’s response, in the face of evidence that the
epidemic turned into a pandemic, was that this might “have the effect
of increasing fear and stigma, with little public health benefit.”453
Laggardly and lamely, he and his staff began to overcome their
inhibitions and try to get a grip on the harsh realities confronting
them.454 A public health emergency was thus declared on January
30th.455 Be that as it may, the WHO was still reluctant to up the ante,
with the Director-General insisting that offhandedly using the term
pandemic would serve no good purpose and merely amplify
“unnecessary fear and stigma, [and] paralyz[e] systems.”456 Moreover,
it might also “signal that we can no longer contain the virus, which is
not true.”457 Needless to say, the caution exhibited stemmed from a
reluctance to antagonize China, the main country concerned about
stigma at that juncture.458
On February 22nd, a team of WHO experts was allowed to visit
Wuhan in order to gather vital information regarding the nature and
potential magnitude of the threat faced.459 This culminated, a week
later, in the publication of a factually based report that gave impetus
to stepped-up efforts to implement emergency preparations
throughout the world.460 Even at that late stage, the team members
deemed it appropriate to go to great lengths to praise China for its
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Freedman, supra note 435.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2021]

THE CHALLENGE OF COVID-19

557

scientific cooperation and conveyed their unease about unduly
overstressing the severity of COVID-19 and raising the prospect of a
“second wave” (the less provocative term “resurgence” was employed
instead).461
It should be noted that, for all intents and purposes, Wuhan has
subsequently receded from the WHO agenda.462 Significantly, its twoperson team charged with the task of investigating the origins of the
pandemic completed in the summer of 2020 a three-week long,
exploratory visit to China without spending any time in the city and
without indicating that this pattern was likely be reversed in the
future.463 The hesitancy has prompted a senior United States official to
observe that “[a]ny chance of finding a smoking gun is now gone”464
and a member of the Australian House of Representatives to point out
that “[t]he international community is right to have concerns about the
rigor and independence of the WHO’s early response to this pandemic,
and its seeming wish to avoid offending China.”465
Equally puzzling, from this perspective, was the WHO decision to
give its blessing (offer “understanding and support,” according to a
Chinese official) to China’s experimental and controversial program
to administer coronavirus vaccines to a very large number of
candidates under an emergency use scheme endorsed by the
government, before their efficacy and safety was fully demonstrated
by clinical trials.466 Paradoxically, this coincided with the United
States Food and Drug (FDA) move in the opposite direction, entailing
the tightening of requirements for its approval of coronavirus
vaccines, which was made in a difficult political climate featuring
intense pressures from the Trump administration to accelerate the

461. Id.
462. See generally John Letzing, At Ground Zero of The Global Pandemic, Life
Goes
On,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
(Oct.
21,
2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/wuhan-ground-zero-of-the-globalpandemic-life-goes-on/ (reporting that Wuhan has relatively returned to normal).
463. See, e.g., Shepherd et al., supra note 379.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. E.g., Nectar Gan, China Says it Got WHO Support for Coronavirus Vaccine
Emergency
Use,
CNN
(Sept.
26,
2020),
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/25/asia/china-vaccine-who-intl/index.html.
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process.467
The WHO’s propensity to refrain, at an enormous cost to its
multiple stakeholders, including the Chinese people, from seriously
provoking the powers that be in Beijing468 holds five lessons for
researchers examining the performance of international organizations
from an agency theory standpoint. First, it is apparent that, at least in
certain crucial circumstances, the tension between pressures
emanating from fiduciary status and its agent counterpart is decisively
resolved in favor of the latter.469 Where appropriate, ceteris paribus,
this lends empirical support to agency theory over competing
paradigms.470
It would be tempting to argue that this is tantamount to belaboring
the obvious because the WHO lacks meaningful independence and is
a mere pawn in the “games” its principals “play.”471 Such an
467. E.g., Laurie McGinley & Carolyn Y. Johnson, FDA Poised To Announce
Tougher Standards for a COVID-19 Vaccine that Makes it Unlikely One will be
Cleared
by
Election
Day,
WP
(Sept.
22,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/09/22/fda-covid-vaccine-approvalstandard/ (reporting that the USFDA was to issue a guidance on new standards for
an emergency authorization of COVID vaccines to boost transparency and public
trust in the vaccines).
468. See Zeynep Tufekci, The WHO Should Not Be a Plaything for Great Powers,
ATLANTIC, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/04/why-world-healthorganization-failed/610063/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (opining on a hypothetical
scenario in which the WHO “did its job fully and properly” so that effective policies
could be deployed globally; and comparing that scenario to the reality of the WHO
supporting China’s official positions including its “transparent coverups”).
469. See id. (“The WHO failed because it is not designed to be independent.
Instead, it’s subject to the whims of the nations that fund it and choose its leader.”).
470. See Stephen Buranyi, The WHO V. Coronavirus: Why it Can’t Handle the
Pandemic,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
10,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/apr/10/world-health-organization-who-vcoronavirus-why-it-cant-handle-pandemic (reporting on the influence China had on
the bloc of African and Asian countries in the WHO during the WHO DirectorGeneral election process in July 2017).
471. See Tufecki, supra note 468 (emphasizing that the success of Hong Kong
and Taiwan in containing and preventing the spread of the coronavirus was because
they understood China’s influence over the WHO and ignored, defied, and
contradicted WHO’s guidance on the novel coronavirus); see also Buranyi, supra
note 470 (quoting several observers of Dr. Tedros’s work as the WHO DirectorGeneral, his good relationship with China, and the risk to the WHO’s credibility that
relationship poses).
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interpretation of what has transpired in these specific circumstances,
however, would not dovetail with the bigger picture. As Nitzan
Chorev has cogently demonstrated, the WHO is capable, within limits,
to autonomously pursue its immanent and transcendent goals.472 Based
on extensive documentary perusal and key informants interviews,
stretching over two lengthy periods with distinct characteristics, he has
inferred that the WHO is adept at identifying “adaptive strategies
available to international bureaucracies that enable them to respond to
external demands in a way that satisfies the member [S]tates while
protecting the organization’s material and core principles.”473
Second, the corollary is that the principal-agent model does not
accord sufficient attention to contextual variables such as State power
and intervening/mediating variable such as regime type.474 Clearly,
China is not just another WHO principal but one with considerable
leverage over the institution.475 By the same token, its political system
possesses marked authoritarian traits that have grown increasingly
pronounced in the past decade or so.476 The combination of superior
resource endowments and an autocratic mixture of offensive and
defensive opportunism is a tall barrier for an agent to overcome, no
matter how ideationally motivated.
Another intervening/mediating variable missing from the agency
theory framework is leadership style. William Bradford has developed
and successfully applied a conceptual scheme for explaining the
472. See NITSAN CHOREV, THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION BETWEEN
NORTH AND SOUTH vii–viii (2012) (highlighting the WHO secretariat’s ability to
reframe demands of member States to fit the WHO’s institutional culture).
473. See id. at viii.
474. See id. at 12 (“Constructivist and principal-agent theories of international
relations have contributed greatly to our understanding of international organizations
as agents. Thus far, however, those theories have paid little attention to the question
of how dependent organizations can protect their agendas, deflect criticism, and
avoid compliance with the demands of powerful States.”).
475. See generally Buranyi, supra note 470 (reporting on the Taiwanese claims
that the WHO ignored its early reports of human-to-human transmission of
coronavirus that have fueled arguments over the extent of Chinese influence over
WHO).
476. See CARL MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN
REVIVAL IS UNDERMINING ITS RISE 164 (2018) (positing what form of
authoritarianism the Chinese government between either Hard Authoritarianism or
Soft Authoritarianism) (emphasis in original).
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relationship between decision-makers’ personality attributes and
compliance with international humanitarian law (which falls within
the ambit of “high politics”).477 The leadership style which reflects
these attributes, in turn, may impinge on policy outcomes.478 There is
reason to believe that the WHO’s maneuvers in delicate Chinese
territory during the COVID-19 crisis were to a certain (unquantifiable)
extent the product of the current Director-General’s problem-solving
approach479 and that another leader (e.g. Gro Harlem Brundtland, one
of his predecessors) would have conceivably handled the challenge
somewhat differently.480
Fourth, it is unproductive to dissect principal-agent dynamics in
isolation, without reference to the whole governance regime in which
it is embedded. Fluid preferences on both sides are not the sole
determinant of the nature of the relationship.481 There are some
structural factors stemming from the fundamental properties of the
477. See William R. Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with
the Laws of War, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1243, 1285–86 (2005) (“People, and not
abstractions such as organizations, cultures, interest groups, States, or systems,
decide whether or not to comply with law, and even if individual preferences,
attitudes, or values are derived from these entities there determinants of behavior
constitute personality-based, individual-level variables that may account for much
of the systematic variance in compliance as between decisionmakers and, in turn, as
between the States on behalf of which they decide.”).
478. See Petia Paramova & Herbert Blumberg, Cross-Cultural Variation in
Political Leadership Styles, 13 EUR. J. PSYCHOLOGY 749, 751 (2017) (analyzing the
cross-cultural differences in political leadership by using a multifactor leadership
questionnaire); Junyan Jiang & Zhaotian Luo, Leadership Styles and Political
Survival of Chinese Communist Party Elites
(Feb. 5, 2019)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3329665 (highlighting the role
leadership styles and behaviors plays in politics and political systems).
479. See Salvatore Babones, Yes, Blame WHO for its Disastrous Coronavirus
Response,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(May
27,
2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/27/who-health-china-coronavirus-tedros/
(noting the Chinese support for Dr. Tedro during the WHO Director-General
election and Dr. Tedro’s public support and endorsement on how China handled the
crisis).
480. See CHOREV, supra note 472, at 164–65 (concluding that Gro Harlem
Brundtland, the former WHO Director-General’s, “systematic attempt to return
WHO to its leadership role” was successful).
481. See Jiang & Luo, supra note 478, at 1 (positing that a politician’s choice of
leadership style is “a function of broader institutional variables, such as regime
types. . . .”).

2021]

THE CHALLENGE OF COVID-19

561

governance regime482 which should not be overlooked in this context.
It would be inappropriate to assume that they might simply be
incorporated into the principals’ and agents’ preference bundles, even
though their presence constitutes a source of opportunities and
constraints when it comes to converting preferences into action.483
The limitations of the much-vaunted WHO constitution lend
substance to this observation.484 The truth of the matter is that this
document may be regarded as more of a platform for expressing
political aspirations prevailing at the time of its drafting and
promulgation than as a genuinely operational vehicle.485 It is apparent
that the constitutional architects behind it were averse to the notion of
delegating to the WHO the powers necessary for fulfilling the grand
vision embodied in the Preamble.486 In a nutshell, the WHO was born
and remains within the confines of the State-dominated Westphalian
international governance regime where delegated authority may
adroitly be exercised by international institutions and their members,
yet it is not formally granted on a behaviorally impactful scale.487
482. See Roda Mushkat, Exploring International Environmental Governance
Regimes: The Asian Way, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 585, 614–15 (2017) (explaining that
internal governance regimes are a collection of principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making/operating procedures that can be found at the regional and global
level of cross-border activity).
483. See id. at 606 (explaining the rational approaches of international regime
evolution should be replaced by a method of analysis that accounts for the
distribution of knowledge as it relates to the identities, preferences, and perceived
options of State actors).
484. See Eric A. Posner, The Limits of the World Health Organization, LAWFARE
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/limits-world-health-organization
(observing that the WHO’s reliance on funding and political cooperation from
countries can result in it being manipulated, as it was at the start of the COVID
crisis).
485. See Alan Hamlin, Constitutions, Politics, and Identity, in CONSTITUTIONAL
MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE 39, 40 (Alain
Marciano ed., 2011) (explaining an expressive reading of Constitutional Political
Economy (CPE) that is more identity based, than instrumental because the political
constitution makes a statement about the political community it relates to).
486. See generally Obijiofor Aginam, Mission (Im)possible? The WHO as a
‘Norm Entrepreneur’ in Global Health Governance, in LAW AND GLOBAL HEALTH:
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 559, 560–61 (Michael Freeman, Sarah Hawkes, & Belinda
Bennett eds., 2014) (analyzing the expansive treaty-making power of Article 19 of
the WHO Constitution).
487. See id. at 564 (analyzing the challenges Nation-States face in the post-
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Given the devastation wrought by COVID-19, the odds of recontracting may have increased, but in all likelihood merely
marginally so.488
Fifth, it might be desirable, for both analytical and practical reasons,
to embrace Bar-Gil’s and Sunstein’s idea of turning the principalagent model upside-down and reversing the roles of
delegator/regulator and delegatee/regulatee.489 Letting States and the
WHO switch positions in such a hypothetical scenario allows the
introduction of the twin concepts of “regulatory cartelization” and
“regulatory capture,”490 setting the stage for a redirection of agency
theory-inspired inquiry toward empirical realities featuring the ex ante
(cartelization) and ex post (capture) control of the delegator/regulator
by the delegatee/regulatee. This seems to be a reasonably accurate
depiction of the WHO’s ultra-cautious treading in Chinese territory
and its consequent inability to rise to the challenge posed by the
pernicious pandemic that has spread in one form or another from
Wuhan to the rest of the world.

VII. CONCLUSION
International organizations of various shapes populate the global
arena addressing multiple issues that cannot effectively be dealt with
by individual States or in less institutionalized international settings.491
These organizations often fail to live up to the expectations of their
Westphalian governance architecture to govern global health issues that spread
beyond geo-political boundaries).
488. See If You’ve Been Exposed to the Coronavirus, HARV. MED. SCH. (Mar.
2020),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/diseases-and-conditions/if-youve-beenexposed-to-the-coronavirus (introducing several new studies which suggested that
the immune system would be able to react quickly and strongly if re-exposed to the
COVID-19 virus).
489. See Bar-Gill, supra note 136, at 2 (“A different set of regulatory problems
— public goods problems — can be conceptualized as a reverse delegation, with the
government as principal and the individuals as agents.”).
490. Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Regulating
Tobacco in a “Laissez Faire Heaven:” The Hong Kong Model, 26 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 277, 324 (2018).
491. See Andrew Guzman, International Organizations and the Frankenstein
Problem, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 999 (2013) (asserting that States create international
organizations to enhance international cooperation to achieve objectives an
individual State cannot achieve on its own).
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stakeholders, however defined, but malperformance by domestic
policy apparatuses is no less common.492 Moreover, relative failure
should not be equated with absolute failure, the implication being that
international organizations at least partially serve the interests of their
constituents, again however defined.493 Indeed, an exercise in
rudimentary counterfactual thinking would amply demonstrate that
dismantling or even significantly shrinking (as distinct from
reforming) them might be a costly proposition.494
Given their ubiquity and functional relevance, international
organizations have been subjected to close academic scrutiny. 495
Particularly careful attention has been accorded to their intricate
relationship with States, heavily relying on agency theory in the
process.496 Conceiving of States as principals and international
organizations as agents has proved to be a productive investigative
strategy overall, generating an array of useful analytical and policyoriented insights.497 As matters stand, no other competing paradigm
can be said to be as explicit, precise, rigorous, and widely
applicable.498
492. See JOSH BIVENS, FAILURE BY DESIGN: THE STORY BEHIND AMERICA’S
BROKEN ECONOMY 95 (2011) (claiming that economic policies have pressured
American working families, causing stress to American’s and harming the economy
broadly).
493. JAMES D. FRY, BRYANE MICHAEL, & NATASHA PUSHKARNA, THE VALUES
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (forthcoming 2021); see Guzman, supra note
491, at 1025 (asserting that international organizations have had a positive impact
despite the lack of control the States that created the institutions have when
international organizations act contrary to the interests of such States).
494. FRY, MICHAEL, & PUSHKARNA, supra note 493; see Guzman, supra note
491, at 1025 (arguing that international organizations should be given greater
authority and States should rely on them more despite the risks of the international
organization acting contrary to individual State interests).
495. FRY, MICHAEL, & PUSHKARNA, supra note 493; e.g., CHOREV, supra note
472, at 12 (analyzing the principal-agent theory and applying its framework to the
structure of the WHO as an international organization).
496. See Bar-Gill, supra note 136, at 2 (analyzing the principal-agent theory as a
framework for considering the relationship between government and individuals);
see also FRY, MICHAEL, & PUSHKARNA, supra note 493.
497. FRY, MICHAEL, & PUSHKARNA, supra note 493; see, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra
note 136, at 2 (claiming that the principal-agent theory helps to frame discussions
that would be too abstract to analyze).
498. FRY, MICHAEL, & PUSHKARNA, supra note 493; see Bar-Gill supra note 136,
at 2 (highlighting that principal-agent theory and behavioral principal-agent theory
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Proponents of agency theory like to invoke the Frankenstein
conundrum to convey its essence and highlight its solid factual
underpinnings.499 In the classic novel and its cinematic adaptations, the
notorious Doctor Frankenstein creates a living creature hoping that
this would help him to elude death.500 Unexpectedly, the monster
defies his creator, killing several people and making the doctor regret
his bold decision and its unfortunate consequences.501 The story
furnishes a vivid backdrop for introducing the logic and merits of the
principal-agent model because, when States set up an international
organization, “they create something with a life of its own.”502 In
taking this step, they face the risk of the “institution becoming a
monster and acting contrary to their interests.”503 States have gone to
considerable lengths to ensure that the monster is firmly “caged.”504
This is an incisive and telling account, but the WHO COVID-19
experience suggests that it is overly mechanical and narrow.505
Because pertinent contextual variables, feedback loops, and
intervening/mediating variables are omitted, the doctor/principal, the
monster/agent, and the space between them have vital behavioral
layers removed and are reduced to one-dimensional entities.506 The
corollary is that agency theory, unless enhanced or reinforced with
complementary building- blocks, may in certain situations
inadequately explain outcomes of the State-international organization
dynamics.507 It follows that, in such circumstances, it may exhibit low
can help to identify the proper scope of regulation, by focusing on personal decisions
made by an individual accounting for deficits of information and of rationality to
explain regulatory intervention).
499. See Guzman, supra note 491, at 999 (observing that international
organizations, which are the creation of States, can act against a State’s interests).
500. See generally id. at 999.
501. E.g., id. at 1000.
502. See id.
503. See id. at 1002.
504. See id. at 1014.
505. Cf. Freedman, supra note 435 (inferring that the WHO’s failure in preventing
the COVID-19 pandemic, despite it being a top priority, is the result of China’s
influence over the previous and current WHO director-general).
506. See Bar-Gill, supra note 136, at 2 (asserting that principal-agent theory can
be applied in political science as a framework for understanding the assistance the
government, the agent, provides to individuals, the principal).
507. See Guzman, supra note 491, at 1025 (observing that the net impact of
international organizations is a positive despite the inherent “Frankenstein
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predictive validity.508
An unflagging portrayal of States as doctors and international
organizations as monsters may prove equally unproductive and may
impede institutional reform to boot. States are doubtless capable of
acting in a monster-like fashion, inflicting enormous damage on
societies both at home and beyond their borders. Where this is the
case, the fault of international organizations may lie not in stubborn
manifestations of defiance. Rather, it may stem from not skillfully
exploiting whatever room for maneuver they enjoy to assert
themselves as agents and chart a course consistent with their nonpartisan mission and their fiduciary-type responsibilities. Turning the
principal-agent model upside-down is a viable analytical device for
bringing this notion into sharp focus.

problem ).
508. See generally Wei-Ling Lin & Grace Yo, Predictive Validity, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITY OF LIFE AND WELL-BEING RESEARCH, 5020, 5020
(Alex
C.
Michalos
ed.,
2014),
https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-007-07535_2241 (explaining that predictive validity is commonly interpreted as correlation
between a test and the relevant criteria and that in predictive validity, the scores
on a scale applied earlier are meant to predict scores on some later measure. ).

